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Even in cases of conquest, it is very unusual for the con-
querer [sic] to do more than to displace the sovereign and
assume dominion over the country. The modem usage of
nations, which has become law, would be violated; that
sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt
by the whole civilized world, would be outraged if private
property should be generally confiscated, and private rights
annulled .... 1
[W]here the King of England conquers a country ... by sav-
ing the lives of the people conquered ... [he] gains a right
and property in such people, in consequence of which he
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1 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 51 (1833).
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may impose upon them what law he pleases.2
1. INTRODUCTION
Under customary international law, conquest does not vitiate
pre-existing private property and contract rights.3 However, the
applicability of this classical rule has been restricted in scope, and
at best it has been applied inconsistently over the last century. This
article examines the rationales underlying the rule and the reasons
accounting for the uneven and inconsistent application of its pro-
hibition of extinction of private property and contract rights upon
conquest. I argue that the primary reason accounting for its un-
even and inconsistent application has been to facilitate the political
expediencies and hegemony of conquering states over weaker and
vulnerable states. Hence, courts have held treaties embodying this
rule that private property rights shall be inextinguishable upon
conquest are subject to the overriding constraint of their compati-
bility with national policy during times of war.4 In the United
States, such views have been fortified by judicial attitudes reluctant
to use international law to restrain the Executive Branch,5 espe-
2 W. Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B. 391, 406 (K.B.).
3 There is a varied range of private property and contract rights that may be
protected from confiscation upon conquest. The range includes rights, interests or
titles to bank accounts; all manner of securities (such as debentures, bonds, annui-
ties, stock, shares, etc.), and beneficial interests therein; fixed and intellectual
property rights; insurance on goods or other property; life insurance policies;
shareholder rights and obligations; judicial awards, and so on.
4 See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1947) ("Where the relevant histori-
cal sources and the instrument itself give no plain indication that it is to become
inoperative in whole or in part on the outbreak of war, we are left to determine...
[as Techt v. Hughes indicates] whether the provisions under which rights are as-
serted is [sic] incompatible with national policy in time of war."); Techt v.
Hughes, 128 N.E. 185 (N.Y. 1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920) (discussing the
compatibility of a treaty granting rights to an alien of an enemy state to inherit
land with national policy in times of war).
5 See Guzman v. Tippy, 130 F.3d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Executive
decisions prevail over international law); Gisbert v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 988 F.2d 1437,
1448 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that immigration issues, legislative, executive, or judi-
cial decisions may prevail even if contrary to international law); Garcia-Mir v.
Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1986) (deciding that the Attorney General
has the power to detain aliens indefinitely despite general principles of interna-
tional law forbidding prolonged arbitrary detention). But see Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Kan. 1980) (holding that al-
though Rodriquez-Fernandez did not have rights to avoid detention under the
Fifth or Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the indefinite nature of his
detention violated principles of customary international law, which create a right
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cially with regard to wartime decisions.6
It follows that the prohibition against extinguishing private
property and contract rights upon conquest is more likely honored
by conquering states when it is most compatible with their inter-
ests.7 For example, the prohibition is often enforced to secure the
private property rights of nationals from a powerful belligerent
state who are domiciled in a weaker state, vulnerable to conquest.
8
Yet, the private property rights of weaker enemy states are often
to be free from such detention).
6 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463-64 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
courts are bound to defer to Executive Branch decisions during wartime since the
Executive Branch, rather than the courts, is best equipped to make such deci-
sions); see also Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Randolph, J., concurring) (stating that "[military decisions] have traditionally
been left to the exclusive discretion of the Executive Branch, and there they should
remain.").
7 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 308 (1829) (interpreting the Treaty
of Amity, Settlement and Limits, between the United States and Spain, under
which the United States was required to confirm land grants made by the Spanish
sovereign before 1818 in territory that later became U.S. territory). Here the court
construed the treaty as a contract between the United States and Spain upon
which the United States was required to respect the Spanish title grants. How-
ever, in later cases, Foster was distinguished by the principle that a treaty might
not create legal obligations except between state parties. See, e.g., United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (holding that the United States agreed to rec-
ognize titles derived from Spanish grants without further legislative acts). Nota-
bly, it was in the interest of the United States to have regard for its treaties with
the Spanish crown, not only because the United States was not as powerful a
country then as now but also because the treaties were crucial to the construction
of the United States as a state. See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in
Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 849 (1989) (discussing the shift in U.S.
world power and its impact on U.S. responses to international law); see also infra
Section 3.1 (discussing Percheman).
8 For example, the United States argued that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
1990 violated Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations because Iraq had destroyed
private property, including oil wells operated by multinational corporations,
which they set on fire. See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and its Annex: Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539 [hereinafter Hague
Regulations] (prohibiting the destruction of enemy property unless the destruc-
tion is demanded by the necessities of war). Note that the Hague Regulations are
an annex to the 1907 Hague Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, first adopted at the International Peace Conference of 1899 and re-
vised at the Second International Peace Conference of 1907. Additionally, in the
1970s, the U.S. State Department took the position that Israel's occupation of the
Gulf of Suez did not authorize it to violate the concessionary rights granted by
Egypt to an American corporation, as these rights were protected under the law of
belligerent occupation. U.S. State Department Memorandum of Law on Israel's
Right to Develop New Oil Fields in Sinai and the Gulf of Suez, Oct. 1, 1976, 16
I.L.M. 733, 750-53 (1977) [hereinafter Department of State Memorandum].
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subject to sequestration or confiscation especially where they are
domiciled in the territory of a more powerful belligerent. It is
therefore not surprising that following the U.S.-led conquest of
Iraq in early 2003, most scholarly and press coverage has focused
on the status of foreign corporations' property in Iraq before the
war.9 By contrast, there has been little attention given to the im-
pact of the conquest on the private property and contracts that
Iraqi citizens entered into before the war. In addition, the human
rights of the Iraqi people took a backseat during the conquest and
only emerged as significant during the planning to return sover-
eign control back to Iraqis.10
9 See, e.g., Chip Cummins, U.S. Probes Its Iraq-Oil Rights: International Law
Gives Occupying Power Freedom to Maneuver, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2003, at A16 (dis-
cussing ramifications of U.S. control over Iraqi oil policy); Stephen D. Davis &
James L. Loftis, Iraq's Opportunities for Energy Lawyers, TEX. LAW., May 19, 2003
(noting that American and British government indications that active negotiations
regarding twenty of the thirty to thirty-five known major oil fields prior to the
war "would form the core of any plans to restore Iraqi oil production to levels in
excess of 3 million bpd."); Robert S. Greenberger et al., U.N. Lifts Iraq Trade Sanc-
tions, Clearing Way for Oil Exports, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2003, at A3 (discussing for-
eign companies from various countries involved with purchasing Iraqi oil); Neil
King, Jr. & Jess Bravin, U.S. May Spurn U.N. Iraq Sanctions: Sidestepping Rules Stud-
ied as a Way to Avoid Delay of Reconstruction Efforts, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2003, at A3
(explaining how the United States found a loophole in sanctions by declaring con-
tract work in Iraq as humanitarian); Anthony Lin, Law Firms See Opportunities in
the Reconstruction of Iraq, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 16, 2003, at 1, 8 (focusing on companies
participating in Iraqi reconstruction); Michael M. Phillips, New Iraqi Laws Target
Economy, Foreign Access, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at A16; Jeanne Whalen, Nations
Begin Tussle Over Control of Post War Iraq: Russia's Lukoil to Protect Claims to Iraqi
Oil Field, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2003, at A10 (noting that Lukoil, a Russian oil com-
pany, will oppose any steps to develop the West Qurna oil fields that the Saddam
Hussein government awarded to it under a contract in late 2002); Pieter H.F. Bek-
ker, The Legal Status of Foreign Economic Interests in Occupied Iraq, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
NEWSLETTER (2003) (analyzing the property interests and contracts of foreign par-
ties before, during, and after U.S. occupation), available at http://www.asil.org/
insights/insigh114.htm.
10 It is however noteworthy that Article 12 of the Law of Administration for
the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, adopted March 8, 2004 by the Iraqi
Governing Council provides that:
All Iraqis are equal in their rights without regard to gender, sect, opin-
ion, belief, nationality, religion, or origin, and they are equal before the
law. Discrimination against an Iraqi citizen on the basis of his gender, na-
tionality, religion, or origin is prohibited. Everyone has the right to life,
liberty, and the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his
life or liberty, except in accordance with legal procedures. All are equal
before the courts.
Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, art. 12




This difference in the application of the rule against extinction
of private property rights and contracts upon conquest is not a
post-World War II phenomenon but rather a reflection of a more
systemic disregard of rights of non-European peoples going back
decades in the history of international law." Thus, as illustrated in
Section 3 below, Native American ownership of land in early
American history was held to have been extinguished upon con-
quest. The various peace treaties between the United States and
Spain treated Native American ownership of land as mere posses-
sion. Similar possession of land by White colonial settlers was held
to constitute unimpeachable private property interests upon con-
quest.
While under the classical international law rule conquest does
not extinguish pre-existing private property and contract rights as
a general matter, the municipal law of conquering states often re-
quires the suspension of all contracts except those of necessity at
the beginning of hostilities between states.12 Thus, the national se-
curity interests and the political exigencies in preventing free
commerce between belligerent states over time modified and re-
laxed the rule against extinction of private property and contract
rights upon conquest.' 3 For example, trading with enemy laws in
the United States and the United Kingdom authorize confiscation
and sequestration of the property and contracts of enemy nation-
als. The rationale for these actions has been to prevent enemy na-
tionals from helping their home state in the war effort.14
In contrast to the rule prohibiting extinction of private property
rights by conquest, the protection of private property and contract
11 A caveat must be added here. In the Civil War, the United States confis-
cated enemy-owned property. Two statutes authorizing the confiscations were
upheld in a divided Supreme Court decision. For the majority, Justice Strong
wrote: "Of course the power to declare war involves the power to prosecute it by
all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately prosecuted. It
therefore includes the right to seize and confiscate all property of an enemy and to
dispose of it at the will of the captor. This is and has always been an undoubted
belligerent right." Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 305 (1871). Jus-
tice Field, dissenting, wrote: "There is a limit to the means of destruction which
government, in the prosecution of war, may use, and there is a limit to the subjects
of capture and confiscation, which government may authorize, imposed by the
law of nations, and is no less binding upon Congress than if the limitation were
written in the Constitution." Id. at 315-16.
12 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE EFFEcr OF WAR ON CONTRACTS 48 (1909).
13 Id. at 104-5.
14 Otto C. Sommerich, A Brief Against Confiscation, 11 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
152 (1946).
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rights under military occupation has a much lower threshold.
Though the occupying power is required to respect pre-existing
private property rights, 5 interferences are permissible where they
accord with the requirements laid down under Articles 48, 49, 51,
52, 53, 54, and 56 of the Hague Regulations. 16 However, these pro-
visions do not anticipate all possible scenarios where the private
property of enemy state nationals may be interfered with by an oc-
cupying power.17 This arguably gives occupying powers wiggle
room to interfere with private property rights in occupied territory
much more broadly than conquest does. In addition, expansive
readings of the duties of an occupying power under Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations have in practice justified broad authority. 18
It is also credible to claim that there are differences in some aspects
of the treatment of the private property of the Fascists and Nazis,
whom the Allied powers authorized to continue receiving certain
payments such as pensions, as opposed to Japanese Ultranational-
ists or Iraqi Baathists. Thus, while the Fascists and Nazis were de-
feated by conquest and their territory occupied, their private prop-
erty rights were relatively 19 better protected than those of the
defeated Japanese after World War II and more recently those of
the Baathists in Iraq after the U.S.-led conquest. I explore this dif-
ference in Section 4 of this article.
In Section 2 of this article, I examine the rule against extinction
of private property and contract rights, its rationales, and why it
has changed over time. In Section 3, I examine how the rule
against extinction of private property rights and contracts upon
conquest has been most attenuated in situations of non-Western
states conquered by Western states, compared to the conquests
among European states. This difference in the extinction of private
15 Article 46 of the Hague Regulations provides that military authorities oc-
cupying the territory of a hostile state are obliged to respect "family honour and
rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions,
and practice .... Private property cannot be confiscated." Hague Regulations,
supra note 8, art. 46. Further, Article 47 prohibits pillage. Id. art. 47.
16 Id. For further discussion of these Articles, see infra Section 3.
17 See NISAKE ANDO, SURRENDER, OCCUPATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (1991) (conceding that "these provisions do not cover
every possible case of an occupant's dealings with private enemy property.").
18 EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 11 (1993).
19 However, both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Paris had provi-
sions justifying the taking of private property rights of the defeated states' nation-
als that were domiciled within the territories of the successful allies after World




property rights and contracts upon conquest is, I argue, a systemic
expression of the hegemonic power of conquering states that goes
back decades in the history of international law. To show this
hegemonic impulse to override private property rights of non-
Europeans upon conquest in the history of international law, I dis-
cuss a 1905 House of Lords decision that explicitly found the rule
against extinction was preempted by the overriding prerogatives of
the Crown. I also discuss Native American ownership of territory
in the early American Republic period which upon conquest was
treated as constituting mere possession, while similar possession of
land by White colonial settlers was held to constitute unimpeach-
able private property interests.
In Section 4, I explore whether the conquest of Iraq is exhibiting
a parallel process of privileging and protecting foreign economic
interests while under-protecting the property rights of Iraqis under
the U.S.-led occupation as demonstrated in Section 3. To do so,
first I outline the law governing treatment of private property un-
der occupied territory before discussing the variety of claims that
Iraqis in general, and Iraqi women in particular, may bring under
the international legal regime to secure their private property
rights adversely affected by conquest and occupation. In Section 5,
I examine the legality of the process of transforming the Iraqi
economy into an open market economy and illustrate how the doc-
trine of military necessity, and the political and hegemonic objec-
tives of transforming Iraq, have justified expansive powers of the
United States as an occupying power beyond those contemplated
by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. These powers include the
authority to expropriate private property rights and the privatiza-
tion of formerly publicly owned wealth in an unprecedented trans-
formation of the Iraqi economy into a market economy. In Section
6, I compare how the "de-baathification" of Iraq compares and con-
trasts with similar occupation reconstruction programs in Nazi
Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan with regard to the treatment of
private property rights. This Section also examines whether a fu-
ture Iraqi government would be bound by the decisions of the
U.S.-led occupation. Finally, I end by exploring the alternative fo-
rums that Iraqis may turn to for remedies for the adverse conse-
quences to their economic interests and the limitations that these
alternatives pose.
2004] 497
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2. THE EFFECT OF CONQUEST ON PRIVATE PROPERTY UNDER
CLASSICAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
In this section, I focus on the effect of conquest on private
property and contract rights. In Section 4.1 infra, I examine the
status of private property rights under occupation following mili-
tary conquest.
The prohibition against destruction of enemy property by bel-
ligerents is embodied in Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Conven-
tion respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which espe-
cially forbids the destruction or seizure of an "enemy's property,
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war." 20 Some have argued that such military ne-
cessity has to be determined given the prevailing circumstances
during wartime rather than retrospectively.
21
This rule against extinction of private property upon conquest
and its underlying justifications is an ancient, indeed, classical rule
of customary international law. It was recognized by Emer de Vat-
tel, the eighteenth century Swiss international lawyer, who wrote:
In the conquests of ancient times, even individuals lost their
lands. Nor is it a matter of surprise that in the first ages of
Rome such a custom should have prevailed. The wars of
that era were carried on between popular republics and
communities. The state possessed very little, and the quar-
rel was in reality the common cause of all the citizens. But
at present war is less dreadful in its consequences to the
subject: [sic] matters are conducted with more humanity:
one sovereign makes war against another sovereign, and
not against the unarmed citizens. The conqueror seizes on
the possessions of the state, the public property, while pri-
vate individuals are permitted to retain theirs.22
20 Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 23(g).
21 MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 678-79
(1961) (noting such circumstances include factors such as the decision makers' po-
sition in the hierarchy of military command, the nature of the property, intelli-
gence reports, every pressure, and even the ambiguity of the rule allegedly vio-
lated).
22 EMER DE VATFEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 388 (Joseph Chitty trans., T. & J.W.
Johnson & Co. 1861) (1758). Vattel further opined, "[t]he whole right of the con-
[Vol. 25:2
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This strict rule was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
United States v. Percheman where the Court observed that it is "very
unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more
than displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the coun-
try."23 Even though the case involved the interpretation of a treaty
peaceably ceding Florida to the United States from Spain, the
Court nevertheless went out of its way to observe:
The modern usage of nations, which has become law,
would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is
acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would
be outraged, if private property should be generally confis-
cated and private rights annulled .... If this be the modern
rule even in cases of conquest, who can discount its applica-
tion to the case of an amicable cession of territory?24
Perhaps we should not be surprised by the apparent robustness
of this rule since it has survived in many forms. For example, rules
of state succession do not allow debts to disappear because they
are carried forward and are binding on the new state. 25 But as we
queror is derived from justifiable self-defence" and "doing of harm to an enemy is
no further authorized by the law of nature, than in the precise degree which is
necessary for justifiable self-defence, and reasonable security for the time to
come." Id. at 388-89.
23 See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86 (1833). Indeed, in
this case, the government rhetorically contended:
What, indeed can be more clearly entitled to rank among the things fa-
vorable than engagements between nations securing the private property
of faithful subjects, honestly acquired under a government which is on
the eve of relinquishing their allegiance, and confided to the pledged
protection of that country which is about to receive them as citizens?
Id. at 67-68.
24 Id. at 86-87. The Court further observed, "[tihe cession of a territory, by its
name, from one sovereign to another, conveying the compound idea of surrender-
ing at the same time the lands and the people who inhabit them, would be neces-
sarily understood to pass the sovereignty only, and not to interfere with private
property." Id. at 87.
25 See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of States
Property, Archives and Debt, Apr. 8, 1983, art. 32-36 (1983), reprinted in 31:1
SELECT DOCUMENTS ON INT'L AFF. 10 (1983) [hereinafter Vienna Convention on
Succession] (establishing the survival of state debts), available at http://www.
austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat / seldoc/1983/3112.html.
Nearly all modem writers (e.g., Calvo, Heffter, Funck-Brentano and
Sorel, Martens, Twiss, Wheaton and others) declare debts due by the
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shall see in Section 2.2 below, this rule has not been consistently or
evenly applied, particularly in the context of colonial relations es-
tablished through conquest.
Where private property belonging to a national of an enemy
state is within the other belligerent state's territory, under interna-
tional law such property is not extinguished by conquest. Rather it
is regarded as being held in suspension, pending its return to its
owner upon cessation of hostilities. Thus, in Brown v. United States,
Chief Justice Marshall noted the "practice of forbearing to seize
and confiscate debts and credits" is universally received and that if
confiscated, such debts and credits revive to their owner "on the
restoration of peace." 26 This principle is also affirmed in British
courts. In one case, the Chancery Division held "it is a familiar
principle of English law that the outbreak of war effects no confis-
cation or forfeiture of enemy property." 27 In this case though, the
court held that an executory contract, which was not connected
with a proprietary right to shares in a corporation, was not sus-
pended as the parties had agreed but rather was dissolved by the
declaration of a war.28 In effect, the court held that confiscation is
only prohibited in cases where an alien has property at the date of
subjects of one belligerent State to the subjects of the other to be free from
confiscation .... It has thus become a rule of international law that nei-
ther the principal nor the interest of a State debt can be sequestrated or
confiscated. Hall maintains that a State contracting a loan is understood
to contract that it will hold itself indebted to the lender, and will pay in-
terest on the sum borrowed under all circumstances.
PHILLIPSON, supra note 12, at 38-40.
26 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 112 (1814). In a more forth-
right statement of the principle, Marshall observed that the "proposition that a
declaration of war does not in itself enact a confiscation of the property of the en-
emy within the territory of the belligerent, is believed to be entirely free from
doubt." Id. at 127. However, Marshall conceded that war gives a sovereign the
"full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy," but that
this "rigid rule" had been moderated by "the humane and wise policy of modem
times." Id. at 122-23. By contrast, Justice Story dissented arguing that while mere
declaration of war did not ipso facto operate as a confiscation of the property of
enemy aliens, such property is liable to confiscation "at the discretion of the sov-
ereign power having the conduct and execution of the war" and that the law of
nations "is merely resorted to as a limitation of this discretion not as conferring
authority to exercise it." Id. at 154. Although Justice Marshall appeared to have
affirmed the modern rule prohibiting confiscation under the law of nations, and
the sovereign power to confiscate enemy property. Id.; Percheman, 32 U.S. at 51
(affirming the rule against confiscation under the law of nations unambiguously).
27 Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft v. Orconera Iron Ore Co., 88 L.J.R. 304, 309
(Ch. 1919).
28 Id. at 308.
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the declaration of war and not merely contracts to acquire conces-
sions, which may ultimately be recognized as property rights. In
this case, therefore, agreements to acquire concessions from the
Spanish government to construct a railway and work an iron ore
mine were held to be executory contracts and not private property
rights. 29
In Ware v. Hylton,3o the Supreme Court upheld the Jay Treaty of
1793 under which the United States had agreed to compensate Brit-
ish creditors if losses arose as a result of "lawful impediments."
This case was brought by British creditors whose debts and prop-
erty had been sequestered by a Virginia law. The Court held that
the law effected a confiscation of the property of British subjects.31
In his concurring opinion, Justice Paterson noted:
Considering . . . the usages of civilized nations, and the
opinion of modem writers, relative to confiscation, and also
the circumstances under which these debts were con-
tracted, we ought to admit of no comment that will narrow
and restrict their operation and import. The construction of
a treaty made in favor of such creditors, and for the restora-
tion and enforcement of pre-existing contracts, ought to be
liberal and benign.32
Justice Chase had been more emphatic about the importance of
creditor rights observing that "Congress had the power to sacrifice
the rights and interests of private citizens to secure the safety and
prosperity of the public . . . [and as such] ample compensation
ought to be made to all the debtors who [were] injured by the
treaty, for the benefit of the public."33
Unsurprisingly, Alexander Hamilton supported the prohibition
against confiscation contained in the Jay Treaty in the strongest
terms, stating in part, "no powers at my command can express the
abhorrence I feel at the idea of violating the property of individu-
als, which, in an authorized intercourse, in time of peace, has been
29 Id. at 309.
30 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
31 Id. at 233 (Justice Chase opining, "the law of the 20th of October 1777, and
the payment in virtue thereof, amounts either to a confiscation or extinguishment
of so much of the debt as was paid into the loan-office of Virginia.").
32 Id. at 255.
33 Id. at 244. o
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confided of our Government and laws, on account of controversies
between nation and nation."
34
Finally, as recently as the World War II period, the norm
against confiscation of private property that had been seized and
sequestered was regarded by one commentator as an important
precondition for the United Nations to build durable peace in the
post-war period.
35
2.1. Rationales Underlying the Exemption of Property and Contract
Rights From Extinction Upon Conquest
2.1.1. The Distinction Between Civil and Military Aspects of War
The laws of war are predicated on a distinction between civil-
ian and military aspects. This distinction arose in the practice of
states that have professional militaries.36 Pursuant to this distinc-
tion, the laws of war seek to reduce war's adverse consequences to
non-combatants, particularly to civilians, the sick and the
wounded of the belligerent and neutral states.
Thus, the laws of war apply considerations of equity and jus-
tice and are embodied in the obligation of belligerent states to treat
civilians, neutrals and prisoners of war humanely. By contrast,
under the doctrine of military necessity, the laws of war acquiesce
to the application of forcible means as necessary and proportionate
to defeat the enemy and to bring the war to an end.
37
2.1.2. War Is Between States Not Between Individuals: The
Rousseau - Portales Doctrine
Another justification for the rule that private property and con-
tract rights are not affected by conquest is that the rules of interna-
tional law governing the conduct of warfare are based on a pre-
sumed set of clear distinctions: between states and individuals;
between a relatively stronger occupying state in relation to a
weaker state; between the government and the people; between
public and private property; and between civilians and combat-
34 See Sommerich, supra note 14, at 156.
35 John Dickinson, Enemy Owned Property: Restitution or Confiscation, 22
FOREIGN AFF. 126, 141 (1943).
36 PHILLIPSON, supra note 12, at 29.
37 See Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and
Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 213-15 (1998) (de-




ants. Thus, under classical customary international law, war was
conceived as something that occurs between states rather than be-
tween individuals. 38 Where an individual of enemy nationality
and her property are domiciled abroad, her property is not re-
garded as having an enemy character and, if seized, cannot be con-
fiscated.39 Where citizens of an enemy state are domiciled within
the territory of the opposing belligerent state, she and her property
may assume an enemy character.40 In particular, where the re-
sources of such a citizen were applied towards aiding the enemy,
she and her property automatically acquire an enemy character
and become subject to confiscation. 41 Thus under customary inter-
national law, individuals were required to subordinate their prop-
erty and contractual interests where they conflicted with the supe-
rior interest of the state.42
2.1.3. It Is Unjust and Impolitic for War to Destroy or Impair
Contracts Between Individuals for the Convenience and
Continuity of Commerce
Since at least the eighteenth century, it has been regarded as
unjust and impolitic that debts and contracts between individuals,
who had confidence in each other and as a result entered into obli-
gations, should have that trust and confidence between them de-
38 According to Edmund H. Schwnek, Legislative Power of the Military Occu-
pant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54 YALE L.J. 393, 403 (1945), the Hague
Convention was developed at a time when war was "waged against sovereign
and armies and not against subjects and civilians." Id. But see El-Shifa Pharm. In-
dus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 771 (2003) (observing in part that the
"fact that Sudan, as a nation state, was not at war with the United States is not de-
terminative .... Terrorism crosses national borders, even our own .... We do
not regard a war against a non-state, non-insurgent group-stateless terrorists-to
be any less a war.").
39 See PHILLIPSON, supra note 12, at 35.
40 Id. at 34.
41 Id. at 35.
42 For example, Justice Gray noted:
[T]he law of nations, as judicially declared, prohibits all intercourse be-
tween citizens of the two belligerents, which is inconsistent with the state
of war between their countries .... At this age of the world, when all the
tendencies of the law of nations are to exempt individuals and private
contracts from injury or restraint in consequence of war between their
governments, we are not disposed to declare such contracts unlawful as
have not been heretofore adjudged to be inconsistent with a state of war.
Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561, 572-73 (1868).
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stroyed as a result of national differences, or in the event of war.
43
Further, some authorities hold that it is prudent to suspend, rather
than to abrogate, loan payments owed by subjects of an enemy to
the subjects of the opposing belligerent until the conclusion of the
war and the return to peacetime. 44
Although as a general matter the doctrine of non-intercourse
prohibits commerce between belligerent states, the strictness
45 of
this doctrine was held by the end of the nineteenth century to have
been attenuated by the "rapid advances in civilization," "progres-
sive public opinion," and the "influence of Christianity" such that
it was possible to differentiate between military as opposed to civil
affairs, and between the conduct of war and of commerce.
46 Thus,
in the United States, as well as in the United Kingdom, trading
with the enemy requires special licenses.
47
43 See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation ("Jay Treaty"), Nov. 19,
1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 10, 8 Stat. 116, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb
/avalon/diplomacy/britain/jay.htm, noting that:
Neither [d]ebts due from [i]ndividuals of the one [n]ation to individuals
of the other, nor shares nor monies, which they may have in the public
[flunds or in the public or private [blanks shall ever, in any [e]vent of
war, or national differences, be sequestrated, or confiscated, it being un-
just and impolitick that [d]ebts and [e]ngagements contracted and made
by [i]ndividuals having confidence in each other, and in their respective
Governments, should ever be destroyed or impaired by national author-
ity, on account of national [dlifferences and [dliscontents.
44 PHILLIPSON, supra note 12, at 45. Further, it appears that rules of state suc-
cession do not allow for debts to disappear upon succession of one state by an-
other. Rather, debts are carried forward. See Vienna Convention on Succession,
supra note 25, art. 32-36 (focusing on the passing of State debts).
45 The strict application of this rule is demonstrated in a Supreme Court deci-
sion from 1814, where Judge Johnson noted in part:
The universal sense of nations has acknowledged the demoralizing ef-
fects that would result from the admission of individual intercourse. The
whole nation are embarked in one common bottom, and must be recon-
ciled to submit to one common fate. Every individual of the one nation
must acknowledge every individual of the other nation as his own en-
emy ....
The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 161 (1814).
46 PHILLIPSON, supra note 12, at 49. Notably, Montesquieu, the French eight-
eenth century philosopher, argued that "[c]ommerce ... softens and polishes [the
manners of men]." ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY AND
OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 107 (1992).
47 For the United Kingdom, see F.A. Mann, Enemy Property and the Paris Peace
Treaties, 64 LAW Q. REV. 492, 499 (1948). For the United States, see Trading With
the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), which forbids trade
with enemies during times of war.
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2.1.4. Considerations of Humanity
Considerations of humanity are another justification given for
the rule against extinction of property rights upon conquest. One
of the most eloquent exponents of this view is John Basset Moore
who argued that:
The protection of property not militarily used or in imme-
diate likelihood of being so used against destruction, not, as
writers sometimes seem to fancy, because of humane re-
gard for insensate things, but because of the belief that, in
the interest of humanity, war-stricken peoples should not
be reduced to a condition of barbarism or savagery, but
should, on the contrary, be enabled to resume the normal
processes of peaceful life as soon as possible.48
According to Moore, the basis of this rule lay in "a moral re-
volt, a new creed," a "loftier conception of the destiny of and rights
of man and of a more humane spirit" according to which the con-
fiscation of property was necessary to "assure the world's com-
merce a legitimate and definite freedom."49 Moore's justification of
the rule is a modernist emancipatory universalism, which is ar-
gued to have prevailed over the barbarity of war and similar dark
forces in the interest of avoiding the adverse consequences of
war.5 0
2.2. Unevenness and Inconsistency in the Application of the
Traditional Canon Proscribing Extinction of Private Property
Rights and Contracts
The classical customary international rule forbidding the ex-
tinction of contracts and private property rights upon conquest has
been undermined by uneven and inconsistent application. One of
the reasons advanced for this inconsistency is that the rule is an-
cient and therefore does not reflect the practice of states. 51 In addi-
48 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME CURRENT ILLUSIONS
AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (1924).
49 Id. at 13-14.
50 For a similar exposition of the expunging of religion from international
law, see David Kennedy, Images of Religion in International Legal Theory, in THE
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 142-3
(Mark Janis ed., 1991).
51 There is a long list of commentators over time who have made these obser-
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tion to the standard menu of justifications advanced for these de-
partures from the traditional canon, I argue that the political and
hegemonic objectives of conquering states have been an important
factor in the unevenness and inconsistency in the application of the
rule. Below, I address how each of the justifications has been
eroded.
2.2.1. The Emergence of the United States as a Hegemonic Power
The Hague Regulations were negotiated at the end of the nine-
teenth century at a time when it was in the interest of the United
States to comply with rules of international law.52 The growth of
the United States' political and economic power over the twentieth
century has been argued by some as a justification for a less signifi-
cant role for international law in governing the U.S. role in interna-
tional affairs.5 3 One commentator has concluded that international
law serves as a tool for U.S. power as opposed to a restraint of U.S.
power in the world today.54 Thus today, almost a hundred years
after the Hague Regulations came into force, the United States as-
serts and consolidates its global military and political dominance
unilaterally 55 and in a manner unthinkable a century ago when the
vations. See Davis P. Goodman, The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of Bel-
ligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1573 (1985) (arguing for a change in public in-
ternational law regarding belligerent occupation); David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occu-
pation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 842 (2003) (arguing that occupation law is outdated).
52 See Jay, supra note 7, at 845.
53 See Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign
Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1104 (1985) (suggesting that "[a]s
international relations changed and American military and economic power grew,
the status of international law [in this country] also changed.").
54 See Nico Krisch, Weak as Constraint, Strong as Tool: The Place of International
Law in U.S. Foreign Policy, in UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 41 (David M. Malone & Yuen Foong Khong eds.,
2003) (discussing the ambivalence of the United States to international law while
retaining strong influence in the development of it); Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical
Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671
(1998) (arguing that the United States presently uses international law as a tool to
expand its power).
55 The best statement of American hegemony begins with the proclamation
that "[tihe United States possesses unprecedented- and unequaled-strength and
influence in the world." National Security Strategy of the United States of Amer-
ica (Sept. 2002) at 1 [hereinafter National Security Strategy], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. The National Security Strategy makes
it the responsibility of the United States to make the world safe and better. It de-
clares the doctrine of pre-emption:
[Diefending the United States, the American people, and our interests at
[Vol. 25:2
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United States was not a superpower. This global dominance, ac-
cording to adherents of this view, has resulted in reducing the con-
straints of international law on the United States.56
In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that upon conquest,
belligerent states with large military capacities like the United
States have often argued that dispositions of their municipal law
override those of international law with regard to the extinction of
private property rights and contracts upon conquest.57 Thus, the
view that it would be unjust and impolitic to adversely affect pri-
vate property and contractual rights in contemporary times is often
subject to the immediate political goals of conquering states. For
example, Israel has argued that it is not legally bound by the
Fourth Geneva Convention and thus, not by the Hague Regula-
tions. Some commentators have suggested that in light of Israel's
sui generis occupation over the West Bank and Gaza, the Fourth
Geneva Convention can only be applied on a de facto basis with
regard to Israeli occupation thereof.58 In addition, the treaties en-
home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it
reaches our borders . . . [and] if necessary, to exercise our right of self-
defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them
from doing harm against our people and our country ....
Id. at 6; see also Henry J. Richardson III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding
United Nations Security Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27
(2003) (focusing on the gestation process of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1441); Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873
(2003) (commenting further on the U.S. National Security Strategy).
56 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 478, 519 (1998) (sug-
gesting that, from the U.S. perspective, the perceived risks associated with law-
breaking have been reduced. Nor does the possible erosion of the connection be-
tween international law compliance and national security mean that it is morally
right for the United States to ignore international law. Perhaps an argument can
be made that the U.S. position regarding international law that developed in a
time of relative weakness ought to be honored when the United States has
reached its place in the sun).
57 PHILLIPSON, supra note 12, at 52; see Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 268 (1871) (noting that the power to wage war includes the right to seize
and confiscate all property of an enemy and to dispose of it at will and that this
"has always been an undoubted belligerent right.").
58 Meir Shamga, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territo-
ries, in ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 262, 266 (1971) ("Accordingly, the Government of
Israel distinguished between the legal problem of the applicability of the Fourth
Convention to territories under consideration.., and decided to act defacto in ac-
cordance in accordance with humanitarian provision of Convention."). Nathaniel
Berman has criticized liberals who support the U.S. occupation as nothing other
than a projection of raw power rather than that the U.S. is an enlightened occu-
pier. See Nathaniel Berman, Enlightened Occupiers?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at
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tered into after World War I and World War II gave the victorious
powers the right to seize, retain, liquidate or take such other action
whose effect was to extinguish the private property rights of na-
tionals of the defeated states.59 The German property confiscation
in the United Kingdom was justified as necessary to satisfy those
British citizens indebted to German nationals. Thus, these confis-
cations, notwithstanding their clear departure from the traditional
canon exempting private property rights and contracts from extinc-
tion or confiscation upon conquest,60 were justified as "the only
source of reparations open to" the United Kingdom.
61
2.2.2. The Distinction Between Military and Civilian Aspects of
War Is Hard to Sustain as a Result of the Nature of
Twenty-First Century Warfare
Twenty-first century warfare, as meted out by powerful coun-
tries, such as the United States, is vastly different from nineteenth
century warfare. While it has been argued that warfare has be-
come high-tech and therefore more precise there has been a de-
crease in the death of civilians and destruction of their private
property, this has not been the case. Rather, the trebled lethality of
high-tech warfare has multiplied, rather than reduced, the impact
of war on civilian populations and property.
62
Several reasons account for the trebled lethality of presumably
more precise weaponry. First, powerful states with such sophisti-
A10.
59 Both the Treaty of Versailles, entered into after World War I, and the
Treaty of Paris, entered into after World War II, provided that it was the responsi-
bility of the enemy states to compensate those whose property was confiscated.
See Mann, supra note 47, at 498-99 (discussing interpretations of the Treaty of Paris
and the Treaty of Versailles).
60 Thus, some judges wrote opinions arguing that the confiscations author-
ized by the Treaty of Versailles were not consistent with the "common law." See
generally Daimler Co. v. Cont'l Tyre & Rubber Co., [1916] 2 A.C. 307, 347 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from C.A.) (Lord Parker dissenting); Hugh Stevenson & Sons, Ltd.
v. Aktiengesellschaft fur Cartonnagen-Industrie, [1918] A.C. 239, 244 (H.L.) (ap-
peal taken from C.A.) (Lord Finlay's opinion); Friedrich Krupp Aktiengesellschaft
v. Orconera Iron Ore Co., 88 L.J.R. 304, 309 (Ch. 1919) (Lord Birkenhead's opin-
ion).
61 Mann, supra note 47, at 498-99.
62 See generally Thomas W. Smith, The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech
and Infrastructural Violence, 46 INT'L STUD. Q. 355 (2002) (arguing that new legal in-
terpretations of military necessity increase harm to long-term public health and





cated weaponry have made sophisticated legal arguments to justify
narrowing distinctions between soldiers and civilians that legiti-
mize civilian casualties and destruction to civilian property as col-
lateral damage.63 In addition, countries such as the United States
have adopted doctrines justifying the use of overwhelming mili-
tary force, 64 such as the use of unchallenged heavy precision-
guided aerial bombs and missiles to support few, but well-
equipped battalions in enemy territory.65 Second, the traditional
humanitarian constraints on the use of military force have been
mobilized to lend credibility to new visions of military necessity
and military action.66 For example, Anne Orford has argued that
the doctrine of militarized humanitarianism that began after the
Cold War, which has accelerated with the War Against Terrorism,
has had adverse human rights and economic consequences for
non-dominant cultures and peoples.
67
Thus, the premise that the classical rule prohibiting extinction
of property rights and contracts upon conquest was justified by the
distinction between military and civilian aspects of war is not any
truer today than it was in the nineteenth century.68 For example, in
the Bankovic case before the European Court of Human Rights, six
Yugoslavian nationals sought orders against the seventeen North
Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") member states concerning
the bombing of the Serbian Radio and Television Headquarters in
Belgrade during the course of the NATO air strike campaign in the
Kosovo conflict.69 In fact, aerial bombardment in the so-called
63 See Roger Normand & Chris af Jochnick, The Legitimization of Violence: A
Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387 (1994) (arguing that laws of
war are drafted to subordinate humanitarian obligations to military necessities).
64 For a description of the Powell doctrine, see Doctrine of Digital War, Bus.
WEEK, Apr. 7, 2003, at 32.
65 Id. at 30-32.
66 See Smith, supra note 62, at 367-70 (discussing the erosion of fundamental
rules and legal maneuvering to permit military necessity to supercede humanitar-
ian law).
67 ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
68 For a similar point of view, see Michael W. Lewis, The Law of Aerial Bom-
bardment in the 1991 Gulf War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 481, 508 (2003) (quoting Clauswitz
to the effect that war is the realm of uncertainty and as such notwithstanding the
technological advances of modem warfare, the uncertainties of war will continue
to produce "unintended consequences").
69 Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), reprinted in
123 I.L.R. 94, 98-99 (2001); see also Michael Mandel, Politics and Human Rights in
International Criminal Law: Our Case Against NATO and the Lessons to Be Learned
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high-tech era of warfare has neither eliminated mistaken bom-
bardment of non-military targets nor has it ended suspicion that
consistent and repeated targeting of certain civilian targets, 70 as
well as private property, was on purpose.71
2.2.3. The War Against Terrorism: The Last Straw of the View
that War Is Between States?
In the nineteenth century, the classical rule restricting the vitia-
tion of contracts and private property upon conquest was founded
on the view that war occurred between states. While there are in-
stances in the history of international relations, such as the threat of
piracy where armed force was exercised against non-state actors,72
the War Against Terrorism declared after September 11, 2001 by
the United States, and later endorsed by the United Nations, has
contributed to the continued erosion of the view that war occurs
between states.73
The War Against Terrorism has come to be defined almost ex-
clusively as against non-state actors. As the Bush Administration's
National Security Strategy says of its global War Against Terror-
From It, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95 (2001) (discussing the failed attempt to com-
mence an investigation of illegal aerial bombardments by U.S.-led NATO allies in
the Kosovo intervention).
70 Examples include the bombing of the Red Cross camp in Afghanistan, the
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Serbia, and others.
71 For a discussion of a series of such incidents, see Lewis, supra note 68.
72 See EDWARD CHANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN SYSTEM: 1801-1811, at 36-46
(1968) (discussing the Tripolitan War between the United States and pirates); RAY
W. IRWIN, THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE BARBARY
POWERS: 1776-1816, at 109-148 (1970) (discussing diplomatic relations between the
United States and piratical states); DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT FIRST
TERM: 1801-1805, at 97-99 (1970) (covering the history of U.S. efforts, including
war, to deal with disruption of U.S.-flag ships by the "stateless" barbary (corsair)
pirates stationed in a number of North Africa seaports. The pirates demanded
ransom payments to allow ships to operate in the Mediterranean without capture.
While President John Adams sought to strike a diplomatic solution by seeking
Congressional appropriations to satisfy the Barbary pirates, President Jefferson
ordered the U.S. Navy to patrol and cruise the Mediterranean and blockade Trip-
oli to ensure safe passage of American ships. Notwithstanding the concerted mili-
tary efforts of the U.S. to ensure safe passage of U.S. ships, war was not officially
declared against the pirates); DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN
27-32 (1951) (discussing the difficulty Jefferson had in dealing with piratical
states).
73 See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1483, 42 I.L.M. 1016 (2003) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1483] (by this resolution,
the Security Council appears to have effectively legitimated the Iraq War that it




ism: "The enemy is not a single political regime or person or relig-
ion or ideology .... The struggle against global terrorism is [there-
fore] different from any other war in our history. It will be fought
on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an ex-
tended period of time." 74 In addition to preemptive strikes against
terrorists or those suspected of it, the United States has adopted an
aggressive effort to "disrupt and destroy" and disable terrorist or-
ganizations from planning and operating around the world
through a variety of efforts, including disabling terrorist groups'
material support and finances. 75 These efforts have been given im-
primatur by the United Nations.76 The Counter Terrorism Com-
mittee, established by the United Nations to monitor global anti-
terrorism activities, has legitimated broad powers to block and
confiscate private property belonging to groups (including reli-
gious organizations and charities that have been shown to have lit-
tle or nothing in common with terrorists) and individuals sus-
pected of terrorism without any due process and in clear violation
of United Nations human rights mandates. 77 By refusing to act
within the confines of international law or with due process in the
blocking and confiscation of private property, both the United
States and the Counter Terrorism Committee depart from prior
practice under which peace treaties between belligerent states ex-
empted property belonging to religious bodies and charitable or-
ganizations from confiscation and liquidation.78
2.2.4. Political Objectives of Hegemonic States Override the
Survival of Property and Contract Rights Upon Conquest
This point is best captured by arguments made in favor of
changing the laws relating to belligerent occupation. Take the fol-
lowing proposition, for example:
Violations of the law of belligerent occupation are frequent
74 National Security Strategy, supra note 55, at 5.
75 Id.
76 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 373, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc
S/RES/1373 (2001) (establishing the United Nations ("U.N.") Counter Terrorism
Committee).
77 See generally Alvarez, supra note 55, at 878 (discussing the U.N. Council's
efforts to combat terrorism as violating international human rights standards).
78 Mann, supra note 47, at 503 (listing exemptions from liquidations and con-
fiscations of property).
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at least in part because the law is too restrictive today; this
unrealistic restrictiveness tends to delegitimize interna-
tional law, increasing the likelihood of continued and ex-
tensive violations. In order to bring this problem under
control, a change in the purpose of the rules of belligerent
occupation must be recognized along with a change in the
rules themselves. 79
These and similar justifications for changing the laws of bellig-
erent occupation are written from the perspective of powerful bel-
ligerent powers with superior military capabilities. The foregoing
perspective grounds the justification for a more permissive interna-
tional legal regime governing belligerent occupation on the need to
maintain legitimacy for international law. However, it says little
about the potential for a more permissive regime of belligerent oc-
cupation to lend credibility to the political agenda of the powerful
belligerent states extending their influence over weaker, less pow-
erful states.8 0
For example, the Bush Administration's designs to introduce
democracy, 81 the rule of law, 82 and free markets83 in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan seem to override any considerations about the legality of
such actions under international law.84 In seeking to remake Iraq
79 See Goodman, supra note 51, at 1582.
80 For example, the National Security Strategy, supra note 55, at 30. President
George W. Bush states:
The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any at-
tempt by any enemy-whether a state or non-state actor-to impose its will
on the United States, our allies, or our friends.... Our forces will be strong
enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursing a military build-up in
hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. (emphasis
added)
Id.
81 Id. at 6. The document further states as an objective to win the war against
international terrorism, "supporting moderate and modern government, espe-
cially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that pro-
mote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation." Id.
82 Id. at 17.
83 Id. at 1, 17-20.
84 See id. at 29, stating:
It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We
must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military's
highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively, our
military must: assure our allies and friends; dissuade future military
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into the most idealistic type of free market economy, the United
States has placed the interests of its leading multinational corpora-
tions at the forefront in transforming public and private wealth
into engines of new profit for the United States. Thus, the appar-
ently enlightened occupier mission of ending a dictatorial regime
by replacing it with idealistic visions of free markets and liberal
democracy may be nothing more than an excuse to legitimate new
forms of oppression in Iraq. Indeed, the victory over the Taliban
regime gave the United States another important military base
85 to
protect the interests of well-heeled oil companies with oil interests
and ambitions in Central Asia that predate the Bush Presidency.
8 6
competition; deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and
decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. (emphasis added)
This seems to set the stage for declaring the need to adapt the international legal
prohibition against use of force in self-defense unless attacked:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer
an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves
against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars
and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption
on the existence of an imminent threat - most often a visible mobilization
of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's
adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using
conventional means. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and ... weapons
that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warn-
ing .... the United States cannot remain idle when dangers gather.
Id. at 15. This doctrine of preemptive war where there is no imminent threat is
inconsistent with customary international law. See Oscar Schachter et al., Recourse
to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 721 (2003)
(arguing that the privileging of the Security Council would make the law avail-
able to serve the interests of powerful at the expense of weak states). But see Lori
Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (2003) (discussing the legality of the Iraqi conflict, especially
contributions by William H. Taft and Todd F. Buchwald, with John Yoo and Ruth
Wedgewood arriving at a different conclusion).
85 For example, National Security Strategy, supra note 55, at 29 states:
The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound
symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends. Through our
willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the
United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power
that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many secu-
rity challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within
and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access ar-
rangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces (emphasis added).
86 See Marjorie Cohn, Cheney's Black Gold: Oil Interests May Drive U.S. Foreign
Policy, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 2000 (reporting that Cheney, then CEO of oil company
Halliburton had referred to Caspian oil as black gold and that he favored the re-
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3. HEGEMONIC EROSION OF A CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
CANON OVER NON-EUROPEAN 'PROPERTY'
As demonstrated in Section 2, the necessities of national policy
and political expediency as reflected in municipal law and the
practices of belligerent states have modified and relaxed the classi-
cal international law rule that conquest does not extinguish pre-
existing private property and contract rights. As a result, conquest
is often accompanied by the taking and confiscation of the private
property of the nationals of the defeated belligerent state(s).
In this Section, I show that this rule against extinction of private
property rights and contracts upon conquest has been most attenu-
ated with reference to the conquest of non-Western peoples and
states by Western states as opposed to conquest among European
states and peoples. This difference in the application of the rule
against extinction of private property rights and contracts upon
conquest is, I argue, a systemic expression of the hegemonic power
of conquering states that goes back decades in the history of inter-
national law. To show this hegemonic impulse to override the pri-
vate property rights of non-Europeans upon conquest in the his-
tory of international law, I discuss a 1905 House of Lords decision
that explicitly found the rule against extinction was preempted by
the prerogatives of the Crown. I also discuss how Native Ameri-
can ownership of land in early American history was treated as
mere possession upon conquest and in the various peace treaties
between the United States and Spain, while similar possession of
land by White colonial settlers was held to constitute unimpeach-
able private property interests.
peal of section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which severely restricts U.S.
aid to Azerbaijan because of its ethnic cleansing of the Armenians in Nagorno
Karabakh, a mountainous enclave in Azerbaijan, to facilitate American oil corpo-
rations from getting access to Caspian oil), available at http://www.cooperative
research.org/timeline/2000/chicagotribune8l1OO.htm; see also Michael T. Klare,
Blood for Oil: The Bush Cheney Energy Strategy, in THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 2004: THE
NEw IMPERIAL CHALLENGE 166 (Colin Leys & Leo Panitch eds., 2003) (arguing that
U.S. foreign policy is predicated on a two-pronged strategy, one energy-driven
and the other security-driven, that have become forged into a militarist agenda in
the Bush-Cheney energy plan). For a critique of the enlightened occupier view,




3.1. West Rand Central Gold Mining Company v. The King:
Conquest Does Not Limit the Prerogative of the Crown to
Extinguish Corporate Private Property
In West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. The King,87 the question
before the House of Lords was whether, after annexation, a con-
quering state becomes liable to discharge the financial obligations
of the conquered state due to individuals or corporations. The
facts of the case were as follows.
In October 1899, the Republic of South Africa seized over 2,617
ounces of gold from the West Rand Central Gold Mining Company
for "safe keeping." Following the Anglo-Boer War, Britain con-
quered the Republic of South Africa and by a proclamation dated
September 1, 1900 all the territories of the Republic were annexed
to and became part of the dominions of Queen Victoria. The Re-
public of South Africa thereby ceased to exist as it became part of
the British Empire. West Rand Central Gold Mining Company
brought suit seeking recovery of the gold seized by the Republic of
South Africa that was now held by the British Crown. West Rand
Central Gold Mining Company urged that conquest or change of
sovereignty by cession ought not to affect pre-existing contractual
rights. Further, it was argued that under international law, con-
quest does not destroy all private rights. According to West Rand
Central Gold Mining Company, the seizure of the gold by the Re-
public of South Africa was a contractual obligation that the British
government had assumed upon conquering the Republic.
Relying on United States v. Percheman s8 West Rand Central
Gold Mining Company argued that the whole of the civilized
world would be outraged if private property should be generally
confiscated and private rights annulled by the British conquest. In
addition, it argued that while claims to enforce treaties or agree-
ments between two sovereign powers were acts of state which
courts had no power to inquire into, the repudiation of liability by
the government for the seized gold belonging to an individual was
not an act of state since the seizure had crystallized into a contrac-
tual obligation.
By contrast, the Crown refuted all arguments distinguishing
private or contractual claims against the Crown, on the one hand,
from public claims seeking to enforce obligations under treaties, on
87 W. Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B. 391, 391 (K.B.).
88 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86 (1833).
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the other. The House of Lords, in agreeing with the Crown ob-
served, "where the King of England conquers a country it is a dif-
ferent consideration, [from peaceable cession], for there the con-
queror by saving the lives of the people conquered gains a right and
property in such people, in consequence of which he may impose upon
them what law he pleases."89 (emphasis added)
In essence, the House of Lords declined to extend protection to
the private property rights of a South African corporation by draw-
ing a distinction between the circumstances under which such pro-
tection applies and those in which it does not.90 Following this dis-
tinction, territory seized by conquest does not save personal rights
arising under a contract (as opposed to private property rights to
land), from extinction upon conquest. By defining the interest in
the confiscated gold as a personal right arising under a contract,
the court declined to follow the classical rule under customary in-
ternational law as adopted by American courts that private or con-
tractual claims survive both conquest and cession of territory by
peaceful means. The court reasoned that the American decisions
were different because unlike the seizure of the gold, they involved
landed property in territories which had been ceded or annexed to
the United States. 91
In light of the court's observation that the Crown was freed
of any constraints in deciding what law to apply to a conquered
people, it is plausible to argue that the decision was made to match
the demands of colonial expediency rather than because the doc-
trine required such an outcome on any principled basis except
those consistent with the designs of the expanding British Empire.
89 W. Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co., [1905] 2 K.B. at 410-11.
90 According to the court:
It must not be forgotten that the obligations of conquering States with
regard to private property of private individuals, particularly land as to
which the title had already been perfected before the conquest or annexa-
tion, are altogether different from the obligations which arise in respect
of personal rights by contract. As is said in more cases than one, cession
of territory does not mean the confiscation of the property of individuals
in that territory. If a particular piece of property has been conveyed to a
private owner or has been pledged, or a lien has been created upon it,
considerations arise which are different from those which have to be
considered when the question is whether the contractual obligation of
the conquered State towards individuals is to undertaken by the con-
quering State.
Id. at 411.
91 Id. at 410.
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This case is compelling because it did not involve non-
European claims to safeguard their private property upon con-
quest. It reveals the malleable, flexible, and contradictory applica-
tions of this customary international law rule's saving benediction
of private property and contracts upon conquest. Sometimes it
was held to apply, but in cases like this, the King's prerogatives
over a conquered state overrode the applicability of the rule.
3.2. Daniel F. Strother v. John B.C. Lucas: Native American Land
Claims Do Not Survive Conquest
The rule against extinction of private property rights was suc-
cessfully applied in Strother v. Lucas92 to facilitate the survival of land
grants made by the Spanish Crown to White settlers. 93 In addition,
use and occupation of territory by Spanish and other White settlers
that had not been recognized by the Spanish Crown or its adminis-
trators as constituting private property rights enjoyed the saving
benediction of the rule against extinction of private property rights
after Spain ceded her territories to the United States. 94 In this Sec-
92 Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410 (1838).
93 Percheman, 32 U.S. at 64, is another example. Similarly, in Mitchel v. United
States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 733-34, 753-54 (1835), the Supreme Court held:
[A] treaty of cession was a deed or grant by one sovereign to another,
which transferred nothing to which he had no right of property, and
only such right as he owned and could convey to the grantee .... [The
U.S.] came in the place of the former sovereign by compact, on stipulated
terms, which bound them to respect all the existing rights of the inhabi-
tants .... They could assume no right of conquest which may at any
time have been vested in Great Britain or Spain.. . new relations [had
been] established between them by solenm treaties; nor did they take
possession on any such assumption of right; . . . it was done under the
guarantee of congress to the inhabitants .... They might, as the new
sovereign, adopt any system of government or laws. . . consistent with
the treaty and the constitution; but instead ... all former laws and mu-
nicipal regulations which were in existence at the cession, were contin-
ued in force.
94 See Strother, 37 U.S. at 438, stating:
In following the course of the law of nations, this Court has declared,
that even in cases of conquest, the conqueror does no more than displace
the sovereign, and assume dominion over the country.. . . "A cession
of territory" is never understood to be a cession of the property of the in-
habitants. The king cedes only that which belongs to him; lands he had
previously granted, were not his to cede. Neither party could so under-
stand the treaty. Neither party could consider itself as attempting a
wrong to individuals, condemned by the whole civilized world. "The
cession of territory" would necessarily be understood to pass sover-
eignty only, and not to interfere with private property.' [sic] No con-
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tion, my claim is that conquest transformed the use and occupation
of land into private property rights upon Spanish cession of territory
to the United States. However, this transformation did not work in
favor of a Native American who occupied and used the land in the
same way as by the Spanish and other White settlers.
In essence, Native American use and occupation of land was
held not to enjoy the same status as similarly used and occupied
land of Spanish and other White settlers. This attitude of early
American courts towards Native American land as falling below
private property rights is further evidenced by cases like Johnson v.
M'Intosh where the Supreme Court held that conquest impaired Na-
tive American rights to land.95 The rationale for non-recognition of
Native American rights to land was espoused by Justice Marshall in
Johnson:
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence
was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in pos-
session of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness;
struction of a treaty, which would impair that security to private prop-
erty, which the laws and usages of nations would without express stipu-
lation have conferred, would seem to be admissible further than its posi-
tive words require.
This proposition is backed up by a series of treaties embodying the rule against
extinction as the 1803 Treaty between Spain and France. Id. at 436 (referencing the
Convention of Neutrality and Subsity, Oct. 19, 1803, Fr.-Spain, 57 Consol. T.S.
201).
95 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). According to Chief
Justice Marshall, conquest "impaired" the rights of the indigenous people of
North America because "their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent na-
tions, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their
own will . . .was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery
gave exclusive title to those who made it." Id. at 574. The Court further held that
conquest gives a title "which the [clourts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever
the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original
justice of the claim." Id. at 588. Although Johnson was decided long after the doc-
trine of discovery was discredited among European nations, it may be said to rep-
resent a first generation case under which conquest and discovery were regarded
as legitimate modes of acquiring sovereignty over territory. With the rise of the
principle of self-determination after World War I, the doctrine of discovery as a
legitimate mode of acquiring sovereignty over territory was eclipsed. For a dis-
cussion of this shift and its problems, see SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF
CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE (1996). For a critique holding that this shift towards self-determination
was not immediately applied to non-Western peoples, such as Africans, see SIBA




to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they
were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were
ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.96
(emphasis added)
In other words, conquest and cession applied differently as be-
tween Native Americans, on the one hand, and Spanish and White
settlers, on the other. While Spanish and White settlers had their use
and occupation of land as rising to the equivalent of land grants or
titles that survived conquest or cession of territory, similar use and
occupation of land by Native Americans did not get recognition as
private property rights capable of surviving conquest or cession.
What is even more striking here is that in Strother, the U.S. Su-
preme Court, in determining whether prescriptive title97 existed in
favour of the plaintiff, recognized "local laws," "usages," and "cus-
toms" 98 as evidenced by "informal writings," "parole agreements,"
and "possession alone, for long time," 99  and even com-
mon/collective as well as private ownership of property land all on
behalf of the Spanish and White settlers but not for the Native
Americans. 100 Thus the Court declares:
[T]he law of this case is the law of all similar ones now ex-
isting, or which may arise, it is our plain duty to decide it
on such principle. That while we do, as the law enjoins, re-
spect ancient titles, possession and appropriation, give due
effect to legal presumptions, lawful acts, and to the general
96 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 543, 590 (emphasis added). In Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 752, the
property rights of Native Americans in Florida were held to be rights of mere "oc-
cupancy and perpetual possession, either by cultivation, or as hunting-grounds,
which was held sacred by the crown, the colonies, the states, and the United States
.... " Indeed the right of occupancy was considered "as sacred as the fee simple
of the whites." Id. at 746. However, Indians did not enjoy full ownership because
the "ultimate fee was in the crown and its grantees, which could be granted by the
crown or colonial legislatures while the lands remained in possession of the Indi-
ans." Id. at 745.
97 Strother, 37 U.S. at 300-01, 304-05, 306-14, 432 (referring to prescription as
"uninterrupted cultivation" of the land).
98 Id. at 435.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 458. The Court observes that in Missouri, "derivative titles" to land
include the "several right or rights in common" and "according to their several
rights." Id. at 459.
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and local laws, usages and customs of Spain and her colo-
nies.101
The Court then engages in a lengthy exposition of the "laws, us-
ages and customs of Spain in relation to the grants[,] transfers and
tenure of village property." 10 2 The description of how Spanish and
other White settlers acquired property rights over territory infor-
mally through usages, customs and local laws parallels non-
European settlement patterns, including those of the Native Ameri-
cans.' 03 For example, the informality of these processes insofar as
they differed from formal grants conferred by written authority of
the Crown or the Crown's representatives. 1°4 Thus, lack of formal
Western education would not bar a settler from acquiring private
property rights over land that had been settled and occupied in ac-
cordance with local laws, customs and usages. 05 Parol evidence to
prove occupation and cultivation consistent with local laws, customs
and usages was permissible 06 for the White settlers but not for the
Native Americans who similarly occupied and cultivated their land
101 Id. at 435.
102 Id. at 450. This exposition goes on in excruciating detail between pages
447-50. The Court justifies this exposition as follows:
Thus connecting the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty, the
laws, usages and customs of Spain, the acts of [Clongress, with the deci-
sions of this court; we are furnished with sure rules of law, to guide us
through this and all kindred cases, in ascertaining what was property in
the inhabitants of the territory when it was ceded. As all the supreme
laws of the land, the constitution, laws and treaties, forbid the United
States to violate rights of property thus acquired, so they have never at-
tempted it; but the state of the province required that some appropriate
laws should be passed, in order to ascertain what was private, and what
public property, to give repose to the possession, security to titles de-
pending on the evidence of facts remote in time, difficult of proof, and in
the absence of records and other writings.
Id. at 446-47.
103 See Carlos Scott Lopez, Reformulating Native Title in Mabo's Wake: Aboriginal
Sovereignty and Reconciliation in Post Centenary Australia, 11 TULSA J. COMP & INT'L
L. 21 (2003) (noting that the communal nature of title to territory in Australia was
also considered as unproductive). But see JOHN W. BRUCE & SHEM E. MIGOT-
ADHOLLA, SEARCHING FOR LAND TENURE SECURITY IN AFRICA (1994) (challenging the
view that communal title is unproductive).
104 See Strother, 37 U.S. at 439 (describing the arbitrariness of the process of
granting land).





in accordance with their customs, usages and practices.
Notwithstanding Native American occupation of land that was
analogous to settler practice, the Court found that lands not so oc-
cupied or cultivated by the settlers in Louisiana were parts of the
King's dominions.107 This effectively meant that land occupied by
Native Americans did not enjoy the same status as that occupied or
cultivated by the White settlers. Hence, those White settlers in this
case who had no formal grants were comparable to Native Ameri-
cans in terms of the informality of occupation by dint of having no
grants from the Crown, their lack of formal Western education, and
the organization of their tenure system in accordance with their local
laws, customs and usages, yet these Native Americans did not enjoy
the saving benediction of the customary international law norm pre-
cluding their land rights from being extinguished by cession. The
Court reinforced this difference by noting that local authorities
should treat Native Americans with "mildness, gentleness and
moderation, with verbal, and not judicial, proceeding."108
It is remarkable that while the Court defines property as broadly
as incorporating "any right, legal, equitable, inceptive or inchoate or
perfect,"10 9 Native American and occupation of land is not regarded
as adding up to legal title. As such, Native Americans were re-
garded as merely entitled to be treated with the patronizing kind-
ness of a "civilized state." In this manner the Court gives imprima-
tur to the colonial and racist notion that non-European use and
occupation of land did not rise to private property rights and that
treaties between colonial powers in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries effectively extinguished pre-existing title to territory based
on non-European use and occupation of land. In fact, as Justice
Marshall held in Johnson, while conquest did not extinguish existing
land rights, this rule did not operate in favor of "a people with
whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a
distinct society." 110 For this reason, the same evidence of use, occu-
pation and cultivation by Europeans that was presented in Strother
was given the status of a private property right. Moreover, it was
107 See id. (stating that the royal ordinance of 1754 gave the king dominion).
108 Id. By contrast, with regard to the White settlers, the Court finds after ex-
amining their customs, usages and local laws: "Such are the laws, usages and cus-
toms of Spain, by which to ascertain what was property in the ceded territory,
when it came into the hands of the United States, charged with titles originating
thereby; creating rights of property of all grades and description." Id. at 446.
109 Id. at 406.
110 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590-91 (1823).
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granted the saving benediction of the customary international law
rule that preserves property rights upon conquest or cession that
was not given to Native American property."'
There have been a few exceptional cases where courts of
conquering powers have recognized the use and occupation of
land by non-Europeans as a form of land tenure with a property
rights system. In one such case, the House of Lords proceeded from
the premise that among the indigenous Maori of New Zealand, there
existed a system of land tenure which was known or was discover-
able, and that this land tenure system was binding on the court with
regard to the natives' rightful use and possession. The Crown could
therefore not arbitrarily disregard this system of land tenure by ap-
propriating land for sale inconsistent with the relevant statutory au-
thority.1 2 In effect, the House of Lords rejected the assertion by the
Crown that no suit could be brought against it upon a native title.
113
But, in the overwhelming number of cases where similar evi-
dence of the existence of a land tenure system among non-Europeans
was present, courts have found that there was no native title, and if
any such title existed, it was extinguished by the conquering sover-
eign." 4 Hence, in 01 le Njogo v. Attorney General, the East African
Court of Appeals held that an agreement entered into between the
Crown and a native tribe was a treaty, and therefore any cession of
land inconsistent with the treaty was not cognizable in the courts of
the Crown since it was an act of state." 5 In this case, the court said of
the argument made by the Maasai about their private property rights
over their land, "[w]hether interference with the private rights of a
subject by officers of the State to compel obedience to the terms of
111 1 explore this theme at greater length in the article, James Thuo Gathii,
Geographical Hegelianism in Territorial Disputes Involving Non-European Land Rela-
tions: An Analysis of the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia),
15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 581 (2002).
112 See Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, 1901 A.C. 561, 577-580 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from N.Z.) (stating that the Crown could not extinguish native title).
113 Id. at 577 (allowing cases made by native titles).
114 For example, in 01 Le Njogo v. Att'y Gen., 1913 E. Aft. L. Rep. 70 (appeal
taken from Eng.), the Court held, without recognizing that the Maasai had radical
title to their territory, that they were nevertheless capable of entering into agree-
ments with the Governor to cede their land, notwithstanding the fact that they were
living in a protectorate.
115 See id. at 78 (holding that the agreements in question are treaties). Similarly,
in Worcestor v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), Justice Marshall held that the
fact the Cherokee nation, a weaker state, had accepted the protection of the United
States, a stronger state, did not mean that the Cherokee had surrendered their inde-'




treaty could be authorised otherwise than by the Legislature is an
open question."116 More definitively, in Sunmonu v. Disu Raphael,117 a
case on appeal from the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the Privy Council
held that there was a strong presumption that the title of a native to
land was a usufructuary right which is subject to the radical title of
the Crown and is held on behalf of the community or family. 18 Con-
sequently, a native title was incapable of conferring exclusive posses-
sion of individual title against other members of the family. While
the effect of this decision was to protect family members from being
dispossessed by the holder of land under a grant, it is nevertheless
indicative of the second-class status African ownership to land and
territory enjoyed in colonial jurisprudence.119 Indeed, as the Privy
Council held in the Sobhuza II case:
The title of the native community generally takes the form
of a usufructuary right, a mere qualification of a burden on
the radical or final title of whoever is sovereign .... Such a
usufructuary right... may be extinguished by the action of
a paramount power which assumes possession or the entire
control of the land.120
In essence, the Privy Council held that since the Crown had radi-
cal title to territory, its acquisition of lands held under the rights,
laws and customs of natives could not "legally interfere" or invali-
date an exercise of the Crown's sovereign powers.121 The upshot of
these cases from Africa, unlike the Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker case from
New Zealand, is that the Crown exercised unbridled and unaccount-
able power as the ultimate owner of the radical title to the territory
116 Id. at 113.
117 See Sunmonu v. Disu Raphael, 1927 A.C. 881, 883 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Nig.) (holding that native titles cede to the crown).
118 See id. (citing as authority the leading case of Amodu Tijani v. Sec'y of S. Nig.,
[1921] 2 A.C. 399 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Nig.)).
119 The treatment of Masubian occupation and use in the 1999 International
Court of Justice case, Namibia/Botswana, is also analogous to the treatment of non-
European claims to land and territory in these African cases. See Gathii, supra note
111.
120 Sobhuza II v. Miller, [1926] A.C. 518, 525 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Swaz.)
(citing as authority Amodu Tijani, [1921] 2 A.C. 399)).
121 Id. at 528; see also W. Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B.
391, 394 (K.B.) ("Where the Sovereign annexes a foreign country the terms on which
he does so are settled by him, and no Court of law has any power to interpret or en-
force those terms.")
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upon conquest or peaceable cession.
Native American land use and occupation, like African land use
and occupation, did not rise to property rights under the Western
system and its customs and usages. Thus, when the court referred to
original title (property rights in land granted by the Crown) and de-
rivative title (property rights in land arising from a transfer from
original grantee or from such other mode as acquiescence, abandon-
ment, adverse possession, prescription, or from local laws, usage,
and custom) as the different modes of ownership of property in land,
it did not contemplate that Native Americans had any such rights or
even a land tenure system.'22
In essence, American courts shared the view with British courts
that international law and treaties between conquering colonial
powers did not recognize non-European occupation and use of ter-
ritory as establishing rights over territory, and if such rights ex-
isted, they were extinguished by the superior title of the conquer-
ing sovereign. In both West Central Grand Mining Company and
Strother, it is clear that both with regard to the private property in-
terests of a corporation or the occupation, use and property of a
non-European community over land, the Crown's authority upon
conquest or cession more often than not overrides the customary
international law rule's saving benediction of these property inter-
ests from extinction.
Thus far, I have laid a basis to demonstrate that the customary
international law rule prohibiting extinction of private property
rights is unevenly and inconsistently applied by conquering states.
Indeed, as the House of Lords held in West Grand Mining Company,
upon conquest, the King is free to impose whatever rules he wants
upon his subjects, including disregarding rules of customary inter-
national law that constrain his power.
Below I proceed to demonstrate that conquering states priori-
tize their hegemonic objectives over conquest states in the name of
maintaining or restoring international peace and security, achiev-
ing a variety of humanitarian objectives and even preempting at-
tacks against them where there is no imminent threat. 23 The wid-
ening agenda of militarized humanitarianism and preemptive and
unilateral strikes to ostensibly maintain or restore international
peace and security has at least two different private property con-
122 See Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 459 (differentiating between
original and derivative titles).





First, hegemonic powers are far more interested in protecting
the private property rights of Western multinationals and privatiz-
ing public wealth in conquered states in favor of these hegemonic
states and Western multinationals.
Second, upon conquest or surrender of non-Western or non-
European states, it is more likely that the private property and con-
tract rights of non-Westerners/non-European nationals do not en-
joy the saving benediction of the customary international law
canon against extinction, or at least to the same extent as western
economic interests. Further, the hegemonic objectives of the con-
quering state to transform non-European states into liberal democ-
ratic political systems and market economies are used as a justifica-
tion, pretext, or as military necessity to disregard, expropriate, or
take without compensation the private property of defeated ene-
mies. This trend is most earnest in European or Western conquest
over non-Europeans or non-Westerners.
4. PRIVATIZING IRAQ: ADVANCING THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES
OF CONQUERED LANDS AND TERRITORIES OR THE INTERESTS OF
MULTINATIONAL CAPITAL?
"The right of conquest has no foundation other than the
right of the strongest." 124
In Section 3, I demonstrated that the classical international law
rule that forbids the extinction of private property rights has been
applied unevenly and inconsistently in the history of international
law. In this section, I explore whether the conquest of Iraq is ex-
hibiting a parallel process of privileging and protecting foreign
economic interests while underprotecting the property rights of
Iraqis under the U.S.-led occupation. To do so, I first outline the
law governing treatment of private property under occupied terri-
tory before discussing the variety of claims that Iraqis in general
and Iraqi women in particular may bring under the international
legal regime to secure their private property rights affected by
conquest.
In this section, I also discuss the international law governing
treatment of Iraqi public assets under occupation and how the de-
baathification of Iraq compares and contrasts with similar occupa-
124 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DiscouRsES 11 (G.D.H.
Cole trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950).
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tion reconstruction programs in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and
Japan. In so doing I show that there is a difference in treatment be-
tween Fascists and Nazis, whom the Allied powers authorized to
continue receiving certain payments such as pensions after they
lost their employment, on the one hand, as opposed to Japanese or
Iraqi Baathists, on the other hand. Thus, while the Fascists and
Nazis were defeated by conquest, their private property rights
were relatively better protected than those of the defeated Japanese
after World War II and more recently, those of the Baathists in Iraq
after the U.S.-led conquest.
An additional issue addressed in this Section is the process
of transforming the Iraqi economy into an open market economy
and how the doctrine of military necessity and the political and
hegemonic objectives of transforming Iraq, as espoused by the
United States in particular, have justified expansive occupying
powers beyond those contemplated by Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations. These powers include the authority to expropriate
private property rights and the privatization of formerly publicly
owned wealth in what is an unprecedented transformation of the
Iraqi economy into an almost utopian form of a market economy.
This Section ends with an examination of whether a future Iraqi
government would be bound by the decisions of the U.S.-led occu-
pation and the alternative forums and their limitations that Iraqis
may turn to for remedies as a result of adverse consequences to
their private property rights.
4.1. Private Property Under Occupation: The Applicable Law and
Available Remedies
While as a general matter conquest does not vitiate pre-existing
private property and contract rights, under military occupation
these rights enjoy a much lower threshold of protection under in-
ternational law. 25 Though the occupying power is required to re-
spect private property,126 interferences with it are permissible
where they accord with existing rules of "assessment and inci-
dence" where the occupant collects taxes and tolls; in addition, the
125 See Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 42 (providing that "territory is
considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile
army").
126 Id. art. 46 (requiring military authorities occupying the territory of a hos-
tile state to respect "[flamily honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private





proceeds of such taxes and tolls must be used to defray the costs of
administering the territory.127 Further, no general punitive pecuni-
ary penalties can be imposed on the population on account of acts
involving specific individuals not imputing the general population
jointly and severally. 128 All contributions must be made under a
written order and can only be effective where it is "as far as possi-
ble in accordance with rules of assessment and incidence of the
taxes in force." 129 Requisitions, where so demanded from indi-
viduals for the needs of the army of occupation, shall as far as is
possible be paid in cash.130 Only assets belonging to the state may
be taken into possession, and where the assets and resources of in-
dividuals are seized, they must be returned and "compensation
fixed when peace is made."131 Where there are submarine cables
between the occupied and neutral territory, seizure is prohibited
and restoration and compensation must be fixed when "peace is
made."132 The property of municipalities, religious institutions,
charities, educational institutions, and the arts and sciences are to
be treated as private property whose seizure, destruction, or willful
damage is forbidden. 133
Some scholars have maintained that since World War II, the
prohibition against interfering with private property rights by an
occupying force is no longer governed by the foregoing framework
of the Hague Regulations. 34 To support this position, reference is
made to Article 46(2) of the second edition of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, 135 which states: "restrictive measures affecting [pro-
127 See id. arts. 48, 49 (explaining that Article 49 further provides that where
the occupant "levies other money contributions in the occupied territory, this shall
only be for the needs of the army or of the administration of the territory in ques-
tion").
128 See id. art. 50 (forbidding general penalties on individuals where they are
not jointly and severally liable).
129 See id. art. 51 (providing that a receipt shall be given to the contributors).
130 See id. art. 52 (stating that, in proportion to the resources of the country,
requisitions cannot involve inhabitants taking part in military operations against
one's own country).
131 Id. art. 53.
132 Id. art. 54.
133 See id. art. 56 (including damage to historic monuments and works of art
and science).
134 Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future
Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 303 (1995) (arguing, in part, that
the original owners of private property destroyed, taken or damaged by an occu-
pier "hold nothing more than the expectation of getting their property back ... ").
135 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
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tected persons] property shall be cancelled, in accordance with the
law of the Detaining Power, as soon as possible after the close of
hostilities."'1
36
There are doubts whether Article 46(2) was intended to dis-
place the Hague Regulations as the legal framework governing
treatment of private property in occupied territory,137 and therefore
this position is not very tenable. An authoritative and comprehen-
sive examination of U.S. requisitions in occupied Japan after its un-
conditional surrender has argued that the United States generally
complied with the Hague Regulations.138 Indeed, it seems plausi-
ble to argue that departures from the customary international law
norms embodied in the Hague Regulations do not establish an al-
ternative norm acquiesced to by Article 46 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention but are, in fact, violations of the Hague Regulations.139
Departures from the rule requiring occupying powers to respect
the private property rights in occupied territory therefore confirm
this customary international law rule rather than create an alterna-
tive rule.
Further, in light of state practice indicating that private prop-
erty damaged, taken, or destroyed during war merely entitles its
owners to an expectation of compensation following total defeat,
belligerent such as Iraq was by the U.S. coalition, 140 it is unlikely
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 46, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm.
136 Id.
137 COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 271
(Oscar Uhler & Henri Coursier eds., 1958).
138 See ANDO, supra note 17, at 104 (describing the history of U.S. requisition
in Japan following World War II).
139 In Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 186
(June 27) (describing the International Court of Justice in expounding on the in-
consistency between actual practice), opinio juris noted:
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it is
sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with
such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule
should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of
the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompati-
ble with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to ex-
ceptions or justifications within the rule itself, the significance of that at-
titude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.
Id. (emphasis added).
140 See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 134, at 303 (arguing, in part, that the




that Iraqis will be able to get compensated by the U.S.-led occupy-
ing force when sovereignty is returned to the Iraqi people in a
peace or other treaty entered into upon the formal end of the U.S.-
led occupation. This might be further complicated because relief
granted in an Iraqi judicial tribunal would have to be enforced
against assets of the United States, either in the United States or
elsewhere. That might be a daunting proposition for a country
crushed by the remaining superpower, in a war not authorized by
the United Nations Security Council in advance. Suits may be also
filed in the United States, the United Kingdom, or in the countries
involved in the coalition, to recover property confiscated by the oc-
cupying forces. Under the customary international law rules laid
down in the 1907 Hague Regulations, where such claims are
proved in principle, compensation would be available. However,
in the United States where courts often treat issues relating to for-
eign affairs, especially in the context of war, as raising separation
of powers issues, it is unlikely that relief would be available.
141
Yet, this does not change the international law rule that a violation
of international law is not excused because it is permissible under
domestic law.142 As such, the United States or any of the occupy-
ing powers in Iraq cannot use their domestic law as a defense to a
violation of norms of customary international law.143 Any of the
occupying powers in violation of the Hague Regulations would at
minimum be liable to pay damages both under the Hague Regula-
tions'" as well as under general international law.
145
"hold nothing more than the expectation of getting their property back.").
141 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998) (arguing
that foreign affairs issues raise separation of powers constraints that prevent the
judiciary from giving relief so as to maintain the integrity of the separate domains
of governmental decision making); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476-77 (4th
Cir. 2003) (holding that "judicial review does not disappear during wartime, but
the review of battlefield [decisions] is a highly deferential one").
142 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 311(3). In addition, Article 46(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties provides that States cannot invoke domestic laws to invalidate its consent to
be bound by a treaty unless such violation of the treaty "was manifest and con-
cerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 46(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
Article 46(2) of the Convention further obliges state parties to carry out their
treaty obligations in good faith. Id. art. 46(2).
143 Id.
144 Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 3.
145 Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 ("It is a
principle of international law that the breach of an agreement involves an obliga-
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The occupying authorities in Iraq are also bound by the princi-
ple of humanity which supercedes the justifications founded on the
military necessity of belligerent occupiers. 146 This principle, which
goes to the heart of the laws of war,147 was recognized even in the
territorial cession conquests of the nineteenth century. 14
8
4.2. Private Property Claims of Iraqis
During the war, thousands of Iraqis had their private property,
including agricultural land, destroyed149 In addition, several
thousand Iraqis deserted their property in the wake of war.150
Some of the buildings were occupied by the advancing forces to
secure supply lines and to restore law and order. In addition, the
looting of the period immediately following the fall of the Saddam
regime in early 2003151 resulted in loss of private and public prop-
tion to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispen-
sable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for
this to be stated in the convention itself.").
146 See ANDo, supra note 17, at 31, 76-78, 108 (stating that no ideological basis
for war can prevent the principle of humanity from applying to a post-surrender
occupation).
147 Id.
148 Thus, in the notorious Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589-590 (1823), the
authority of the conquering power was regarded as being subject to "a general
rule, [required by the constraints of humanity and public opinion], that the con-
quered shall not be wantonly oppressed... without injury to his [the conqueror]
fame, and hazard to his power."
149 See, e.g., Brian MacQuarrie, For Iraqis, A Struggle to Recoup Loss, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2003, at Al (reporting that U.S. military officials have received
about 2,500 Iraqi claims of damage or loss of property related to the war); U.S.
Forces Demolish Iraq Homes, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 3, 2004 (reporting that
the U.S. military was destroying Iraqi homes as punishment for the insurgency
during the occupation period), at http://www.news.com.au/common/story-
page/0,4057,7942137%5E1702,00.html; OCCUPATION WATCH CENTER IN BAGHDAD &
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ, JOINT REPORT
ON CIVILIAN CASUALTY CASUALTIES AND CLAIMS RELATED TO U.S. MILITARY
OCCUPATIONS (on file with author) [hereinafter JOINT REPORT] (noting how "the
U.S. military and lawyers dealt with Iraqi victims of military operations who were
requesting compensation."), available at http://www.unponteper.it/osservatorio/
report-% 20OW-engl.htm.
150 UNITED NATIONS, HUMANITARIAN APPEAL FOR IRAQ: REVISED INTER-AGENCY
APPEAL 1 APRIL - 31 DECEMBER, 2003, at 12-13, 15, 45, 49, 54 (2003) (detailing
displacement and damage resulting from the war), available at http://www.
reliefweb.int/appeals/2003/files/irq03flash2.pdf.
151 See John Daniszewski & Geoffrey Mohan, Looters Bring Baghdad New





erty and significant cultural artifacts. 5 2 The insecurity resulting
from the looting, as well as from the insurgency against the occu-
pation, has developed into a low intensity violence that continues
to disproportionately affect Iraqis, both in terms of human loss and
suffering as well as in further destruction of their private property.
Add to these casualties those resulting from U.S. cluster munitions,
"accidental" bombings, and other military related activities that
evidence the "inescapable brutality of modern warfare."
15 3
However, there are many other claims relating to property
damage arising from the movement of occupying power tanks and
military vehicles, including injury or death to Iraqi livestock, bicy-
cles, and so on.154 The U.S. Air Force runs a program under the
Foreign Claims Act to compensate such losses which are unrelated
to combat. The Judge Advocate, who makes determinations for
compensation in such cases, applies local law and custom. This ex-
ercise is made difficult by problems of language difference and de-
termining compensation schemes for claims such as camels injured
or killed by the occupying forces or their civilian employees. 1
55
4.3. Private Property Claims of Iraqi Women
Women are affected differently and arguably more adversely
by conquest and war than men.156 That is no different in Iraq. Al-
152 Article 56 of the Hague Regulations provides that the property of munici-
palities and institutions dedicated to education, the arts and sciences shall be
treated as private property. In addition, the Article forbids the seizure, destruc-
tion and willful damage of the foregoing properties and historic monuments and
works of art and science. Article 47 prohibits pillage. The pilfering by looters, in-
cluding U.S. soldiers, of Iraq's rich cultural artifacts in its Baghdad museums
clearly violated the foregoing provisions of the Hague Regulations. Hague Regu-
lations, supra note 8, arts. 56, 47. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 73, addressing this
problem.
153 Nehal Bhuta, A Global State of Exception? The United States and World Order,
10 CONSTELLATIONS 2003, at 3, available at http://www.constellationsjournal.org
/Bhuta.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
154 See Vanessa Blum, After the War, A Time to Pay: How JAG Lawyers Settle For-
eign Claims Over Non-Combat Damage, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at 1 (describing
cooperation to Iraqis for property damage by the occupying troops).
155 See id. (exploring the roles of Army lawyers in the compensation scheme).
156 JUDITH G. GARDAM & MICHELE J. JARVIS, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2001) (noting in part that "one of the most significant fac-
tors leading to the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women is the en-
demic discrimination that they experience in all societies."); see also CYNTHIA
ENLOE, MANEUVERS: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MILITARIZING WOMEN'S LIVES
(2000) (showing how women's lives and society in general has been militarized
both deliberately and consciously in complex and ever-changing ways).
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though, at a formal level in the 1970s, equal protection was ex-
tended to women and efforts were made to facilitate their access to
the ballot box, the education system, the political system, and even
to own private property, the 1991 Gulf War reversed these gains as
the Saddam regime resorted to a conservative Islamic religious and
traditional family law system as part of the nationalist response to
Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War. The sanctions imposed by the
United Nations ("U.N.") following this war further eroded the
gains women had made in the formal economy. 5 7
According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, about seventy-five percent of Iraqi women
were literate in 1987. By 2000, less than twenty-five percent were
literate.158 In addition, the government purged women from gov-
ernment jobs to make way for men, thereby restricting chances of
formal employment for women. This in turn facilitated their stay-
ing at home consistently with the advent of the new conservative
nationalism after the 1991 Gulf War. 59 With Iraq's economy get-
ting even worse at the end of 2003, as indicated by falling house-
hold income to $450-610 from $3,600 per person in 1980, the posi-
tion of women is all the more vulnerable. 160  The Interim
Governing Council, appointed by the U.S.-led Occupation Iraqi
Coalitional Provisional Authority ("CPA"), was initially unclear
how to resolve the status of personal and religious laws in relation
to guarantees of equality. 161 Eventually the CPA approved an In-
terim Administrative Law granting equality rights to women with-
out arriving at a formula on how to balance equality rights for
women, on the one hand, and the cultural, social, and religious
practices of Iraqi society, including those of Islam, on the other.162
157 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRIEFING PAPER: BACKGROUND ON WOMEN'S
STATUS IN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE FALL OF THE SADDAM HUSSEIN GOVERNMENT (2003)




160 Steve Schifferes, Iraq's Economy Declines By Half, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Oct.
10, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3181248.stm.
161 See Jim Lobe, Women's Rights in Iraq Under the IGC: A Crisis is Brewing,
ZNET, Feb. 5, 2004 (discussing Iraqi Governing Council Resolution 137, which
would, if approved by the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA"), create reli-
gious laws to be administered by clerics form the countries' different faiths), at
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=43&ItemID=4936.
162 LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD, supra note 10, art. 12. However, Article 13(F) provides that "[e]ach Iraqi




The U.S.-led occupation has arguably been typical of belligerent
treatment of issues relating to women as peripheral to the larger
war effort, and to the extent that women's involvement is called
into question, it is in the position of wives, mothers, widows or
prostitutes who support the war effort on the home front and in
the theatre of war who need the benevolent protection of the bel-
ligerents.163 The United States has also invented a postwar role for
women in reviving the Iraqi economy, all of course consistent with
the free market vision of the U.S.-led coalition. 64
The private property rights of Iraqi women are made even
more precarious by the thousands of deaths of Iraqi men in and
out of the military and the thousands being held in Iraq and out-
side the country. As women increasingly head families and be-
come the breadwinners of their families, the liberalizing economic
reforms further exacerbate their situation. The application of tradi-
tional and customary norms in the investigation of damage to
property and human lives undertaken by the United States under
the Foreign Claims Act in Somalia indicates the danger of the oc-
cupying authorities doing the same in Iraq: a Somali man's life
was valued at 100 camels, while that of a woman at 50 camels. 165
The occupying authorities must avoid the danger of reinscribing
the sexist differentiation between the lives, assets, and property of
women, on the one hand, and the lives and assets of men, on the
other. The vulnerability of women is further suggested by the fact
that women would more likely than not claim title to movable as-
sets, as opposed to more valuable immovable property that may be
Coercion in such matters shall be prohibited." Id. For insightful essays on the re-
lationship between women's rights, culture, the market and international institu-
tions, see Symposium, Globalization and Comparative Family Law, 67 ALBANY L. REV.
54 (2004) (with a foreword by James Thuo Gathii and Patricia Youngblood Rey-
han).
163 GARDAM & JARVIS, supra note 156, at 35-37.
164 Paula Dobriansky, Under-secretary of State for Global Affairs, ensured
that the United States has engaged in the activities that advance the interests of
Iraqi women in areas of human rights, politics, economics, and education. The
first priority of the United States, according to Dobriansky, is the security of Iraqi
women and their families. Ensuring their security will bring about a revival of
economic freedom in Iraq, and will facilitate greater participation of Iraqi women
in the reconstruction efforts. Paula Dobriansky, Standing Up for Iraqi Women,
WASH. POST, July 2, 2003, at A23.
165 Blum, supra note 154, at 17. By contrast, the report notes that the highest
award granted under the Foreign Claims Act was a $1 million settlement arising
from a golf course accident involving a member of the U.S. Navy that struck an
Australian woman with a golf ball and caused her serious injury. Id.
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registered in their husbands' names in the current economy in Iraq.
In light of these problems, the occupying authorities must develop
a pragmatic methodology to compensate women for damage and
confiscation of their property by adopting egalitarian estimates of
the value of their assets from within their cultural, customary, and
religious norms, instead of relying on dominant narratives that re-
inforce the patriarchal hierarchy and the patronizing mission of
conquest. 166
5. IRAQ'S PUBLIC ASSETS AND RESOURCES: THE LEGALITY OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERFERENCES RELATED TO PRIVATIZATION AND
OTHER BROAD BASED MEASURES OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
5.1. The Applicable Rules
Under the Hague Regulations, an occupying power is an ad-
ministrator or usufructuary.167 Article 55 reiterates the obligation
of an occupying state to safeguard the capital of public properties
and "to administer them in accordance with the rules of usu-
fruct." 168 Pursuant to this rule, an occupant does not own public
property in occupied territory and cannot, therefore, "sell or oth-
erwise transfer ownership of the property to third parties." 169 Con-
sequently, the occupier is only authorized to "take possession"
170
of movable assets including cash, funds, realizable securities, de-
pots of arms and so on, but only where necessary for use in mili-
tary operations. 171 Seizure of private property for use in military
operations "must be restored and compensation fixed when peace
is made." 172 It follows that Article 53 of the Hague Regulations
166 See Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond
to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 381 (2000) (offering description of the critical pragmatic approach). In
Iraq, the process of filing claims under the Foreign Claims Act has been compli-
cated by security, language and other barriers. JOiNT REPORT, supra note 149.
167 See Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 55 ("The occupying State shall be
regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate,
forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the
occupied country."); see also JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 61 (Peter Birks & Grant
McLeod trans., 1987) (defining "usufruct" as the right to use the fruits of another
person's property with the duty to preserve its substance).
168 Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 55.
169 Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 134, at 313.






does not authorize taking possession of objects which cannot be
used for military purposes.1 73
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations governs the scope of the
authority of an occupying power. It provides:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed
into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as pos-
sible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless abso-
lutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.174
The right of an occupying power to administer occupied territory
under Article 43 must be justified by its duty to restore and ensure
public order and it must respect the laws of the occupied territory
unless absolutely prevented. As such, large-scale social and eco-
nomic transformations of a conquered territory, unless justified by
considerations of public safety, are outside the purview of Article
43. In some contexts, such massive societal transformations by an
occupant fall within the debellatio doctrine which presumes the
complete dissolution of the occupied state.175 Proceeding from
analogous reasoning, the Allied Powers of the post-World War II
period justified their occupation of the Axis states on the basis of
"New Order in Europe." 176 Such expansive powers on the part of
conquering and occupier states suggest an agenda of imposing
their social, economic, and political systems and values on less
powerful conquered and occupied states.
In fact, conquest invariably involves a "relationship of
power, of domination [and] varying degrees of a complex hegem-
ony" 177 between the conquering and the conquered state. Thus,
conquering states unsurprisingly seek to remake conquered states
to adopt their ostensibly superior norms of economy, society and
politics. Conquering states justify the imposition of such hege-
monic goals by linking them to humanitarianism and showing how
conquest is really intended to serve noble objectives such as pre-
serving international peace and security and enhancing the human
173 ERNEST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 52 (1942).
174 Hague Regulations, supra note 8, at art. 43.
175 See BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 57-58, 92-96.
176 Id. at 64-65.
177 EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 5 (1979).
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rights protections of the "oppressed" populations of the conquered
country. 178
5.2. The Iraqi Conquest and Occupation Reforms
The Anglo-American victory over Iraq was primarily premised
on finding weapons of mass destruction to preempt their use in fu-
ture terrorist attacks. Pre-war planning was especially poor 79 and
ad hoc reasons for the decision to go to war with Iraq without Se-
curity Council authorization ranged from enforcement of Security
Council Resolutions going back a decade to ending mass murder
and torture.180 Since the late 1990s it has been a policy of the
United States to assist in regime change by replacing Saddam Hus-
sein.' 8 ' Lurking behind these justifications and the inability of the
United States and the United Kingdom to build a coalition author-
ized by the Security Council was the question of Iraqi oil -could
178 But see Mustapha Kamal Pasha, Predatory Globalization and Democracy in the
Islamic World, 581 ANNALS OF THE ACAD. OF POL. SCl. 121-32 (2002) (exploring how
universal claims of economy and democracy fail to deal with the internal crisis of
illegitimate Islamic States and their illiberal cultural politics).
179 See The War: What Washington Won't Tell Us, Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 2003, at 140,
stating that:
The United States risks being seen as an imperialist in the Middle East
rather than a liberator if it doesn't allow the Iraqis to manage their own
oil fields .... There is an ongoing debate ... on whether a U.S. general
should run a post-Saddam Iraq... or whether there should a quick tran-
sition to international agencies, then to Iraqis .... Even the kind of de-
mocracy to be introduced is unclear .... It's two minutes to midnight,
and Americans are justifiably nervous. We appear to be unprepared for
the cost of war, the price of occupation, and the demands of ensuring
long-term peace.
180 For a restatement of this view, see William H. Taft IV & Todd Buchwald,
Preemption, Iraq and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003). For a discussion
of whether the United States had the mandate to decide whether prior Security
Council Resolutions authorized the use of force, see Thomas Franck, What Happens
Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L., 607 (2003).
181 See the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which provides that:
It is the sense of the Congress that once the Saddam Hussein regime is
removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq's
transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial hu-
manitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transi-
tion assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals,
and by convening Iraq's foreign creditors to develop a multilateral re-
sponse to Iraq's foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein's regime.
Pub. L. No. 105-338, 112 Stat. 3178, sec. 7 (codified as amended in sections of Title
22 of the U.S. Code), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/
libact103198.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss2/2
RIGHTS UPON CONQUEST
all the other reasons have been a pretext for seeking control of one
of the richest oil sources in the world today or was it to demon-
strate the unparalleled military might of the United States to other
rogue states?
Upon arrival in Baghdad following the ouster of the Saddam
regime, the question arose whether the U.S.-led coalition would
follow the laws governing occupants of a territory upon conquest
or if they would turn over the country to the U.N. to transition it
towards a new government. The coalition opted to be governed by
the law of occupation. However, without a role for the U.N., the
application of this law lacked an institutional context outside the
coalition that would hold the coalition accountable under the law
of occupation. In addition, the coalition needed the legitimacy it
had failed to get by going to war without Security Council authori-
zation. By the vaguely worded Resolution 1483 of May 2003,182 the
Security Council gave the CPA the imprimatur of legitimacy to
administer Iraq.183 Though the preamble to the resolution called
upon the occupying powers to comply with the Fourth Geneva
Convention and the Hague Regulations of 1907,184 it did not ex-
pressly decide that the scope of the power of the occupying CPA
would be determined by either of these sets of international obliga-
tions. In addition, the Security Council did not establish an ac-
countability mechanism. Such vagueness and lack of an account-
ability mechanism, in turn, provides wiggle room for the
occupying states to justify expansive powers under the ostensible
cover of maintaining international peace and security.'85
However, as I note below, the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq is
bound not only by the Hague Regulations, but also by rules of in-
ternational humanitarian law which form part of customary inter-
182 See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 73 (calling on the "[CPA], consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the
welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory
.... ) (emphasis added).
183 Id.
184 Id. For circumstances under which the Preamble (or object and purpose
clauses) may be regarded as part of the substantive provisions of an international
legal instrument, see James Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 291, 305 (2002).
185 See Alvarez, supra note 55, at 882-883 ("[U.N.] Resolution 1483 leaves the
U.N. role in postwar Iraq extremely vague and uncertain .... "); King & Bravin,
supra note 9 (noting that as the United States tries to reconstruct Iraq, it will be
hindered by U.N. rules).
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national law. For now it will suffice to note that the U.S. State De-
partment has referred to the Hague Regulations of 1907 regulating
private property as codifying existing international law. 8 6 U.S.
federal courts have also recognized the application of the Hague
Regulations. For example, in 2002, the Ninth Circuit found that the
seizure of property by the Austrian government during World War
II was a violation of the Hague Regulations.
187
In addition, the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice recog-
nizes these rules, and there is persuasive authority that multilateral
conventions apply to belligerent occupation as well.188 Yet, there is
still ambiguity, at least at a formal level, of the applicable law gov-
erning the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. Hence, a commentator has
argued that Iraq ought to have been administered by an U.N.-led
transitional authority with a clearly planned mandate meeting the
needs of Iraq and Iraqis. 89
It would seem that the ambiguity of the limits of the U.S.-led
coalition's authority provides wiggle room to transform Iraq as the
U.S.-led occupation would like. This is apparently validated by the
fact that the United States' experience of handling Kosovo's post-
conflict transition, particularly in the privatization of state-owned
property, was resisted for its inconsistency with a U.N. resolu-
tion. 90 In the absence of a U.N. Resolution, the Bush Administra-
tion and U.S.-appointed Civilian Governor Paul Bremmer have
single-handedly, and without any apparent consultation with the
U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council, issued a series of wide-
ranging orders authorizing, among other things: foreign investors
to own up to one hundred percent interest in Iraqi companies
(without profit repatriation conditions) in virtually all sectors of
186 Department of State Memorandum, supra note 8, at 734-35.
187 Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
188 See Theodor Meron, Applicability of Multilateral Conventions to Occupied Ter-
ritories, 72 AM. J. INT'L. L., 542 (1978) (noting whether an occupying power as a bel-
ligerent occupation has to apply a new multilateral treaty); Theodor Meron, The
Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L. L., 239, 243 (2000) (noting the
tension between "military necessity and restraint on the conduct of belligerents");
Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L. L, 78, 79 (2000) (noting that until there is a more com-
prehensive code of laws of war, principles of international law apply to belliger-
ents).
189 Scheffer, supra note 51, at 859.
190 See Daphne Eviatar, Free-Market Iraq? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 2004,
at B9 (noting the debate over reconstruction and privatization of Kosovo is due to
the U.N. authority over Kosovo being set up by a peace treaty after a war sanc-




the economy' 9' while leaving the oil industry in the hands of a pro-
fessional management team who would be independent from po-
litical control; 92 the appointment of a former Shell Oil Company
CEO to be Chair of an advisory committee to oversee the rehabili-
tation of Iraq's oil industry;193 a flat tax; 94 a U.S.-Middle East free
trade area;195 the privatization of the police force;196 formation of a
stock market with electronic trading;197 and the establishment of
modem income tax, banking, and commercial law systems under
the direction of U.S. contractors. 198
A yet-to-be released plan dubbed "Moving the Iraqi Economy
From Recovery to Sustainable Growth," drafted in part by U.S.
Treasury Department officials, is widely regarded as a blueprint
for reorganizing the Iraqi economy along a free market model.199
191 Coalitional Provisional Authority Order No. 39: Foreign Investment
(CPA/ORD/19 September 2003/39), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org
/regulations/20030921_CPAORD39.pdf. Some commentators have suggested
that this Order is 'highly troublesome' since it conflicts with the Iraqi Constitu-
tion. Thomas Catan, Iraqi Business Deals May Be Invalid, Law Experts Warn, FIN.
TIMEs, Oct. 29, 2003, at 14. The conservative Heritage Foundation has called for
widespread privatization of publicly held Iraqi assets. Dr. Ariel Cohen & Gerald
P. O'Driscoll, Jr., The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq, The Heri-
tage Foundation, Mar. 5, 2003, at http://www.heritage.org/research/middleast
/bg1633.cfm.
192 See Chip Cummins, State-Run Oil Company is Being Weighted for Iraq: Offi-
cials in Baghdad Using Saudi Arabia and Kuwaiti Models; Little Role for Western Firms,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2004, at Al (noting the opinion of occupation advisors that the
oil industry should be kept in state hands).
193 See Neela Banerjee, A Retired Shell Executive Seen as Likely Head of Produc-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at B12 (noting that the former chief executive of
Shell Oil is expected to be the leading contender to oversee Iraqi oil production).
194 Coalitional Provisional Authority Order No. 37: Tax Strategy for 2003
(CPA/ORD/19 September 2003/37), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
regulations/20030921_CPAORD37.pdf. The flat rate tax is apparently down from
forty-five percent under Saddam.
195 Jess Bravin & Chip Cummins, A Global Journal Report: U.S. Offers Conces-
sions to U.N. in Bid to Lift Sanctions on Iraq, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2003, at Al.
196 See Andrew Higgins, Contract Cops: As It Wields Power Abroad, U.S. Out-
sources Law and Order Work, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2004, at Al (noting that with the
addition of a police force in Iraq, the issue of reporting crimes is in a state of disar-
ray).
197 See Neil King, Jr., Bush Officials Draft Broad Plan for Free-Market Economy in
Iraq, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2003, at Al (noting that execution of the electronic stock
market would fall to private American contractors).
198 Id.; see also Bob Sherwood, Legal Reconstruction: Investors Want Reassurance
Over Iraq's Framework of Commercial Law, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 2003, at 14 (noting that
international companies are calling for a recognizable legal framework).
199 King, supra note 197.
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Two primary premises of the privatization effort underpinning this
effort are that Western-based firms are capable of making Iraq as-
sets and resources more productive and that private ownership at
a time when there is no stable government in the country is prefer-
able to public ownership of assets.200 In addition, these reforms are
predicated on the view that a future Iraqi government organized
around a model of free market democracy would be unlikely to be-
come as dictatorial and inclined to developing weapons of mass
destruction as the Saddam Hussein regime was. These reforms
have been widely criticized for being thinly veiled plans to give
multinational corporations access to Iraqi assets.201
The exercise of these expansive powers to transform Iraq into a
free market economy incorporating controversial elements such as
a flat tax have been justified as falling within the scope of the
CPA's mandate of promoting "the welfare of the Iraqi people
through the effective administration of the territory" 202 and assist-
ing in the "economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustain-
able development ... ."203 While this Security Council Resolution
is at best a controversial source of such expansive authority, 204 it is
scarcely arguable that the powers being exercised by the CPA in
signing privatization contracts lack legitimacy among a broad
range of Iraqis 2°5 and potentially may be subject to reversal by a
200 For similar views justifying a role for the private sector in post-war recon-
struction, see Allan Gerson, Peace Building: The Private Sector's Role, 95 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 102 (2001).
201 E.g., Sara Flounders, The Corporate Looting of Iraq, Workers World News
Service July 24, 2003) (describing how "[clorporate America is determined to lay
hold of the fabulous oil resources and the developed infrastructure."), at
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/FLO307B.html; The Rape of Iraq, World
Socialist Web Site (May 9, 2003) (noting that major U.S. corporations are "seeking
to profit from the misery of the Iraqi people."), available at http://www.
wsws.org/ articles/2003/may2003/iraq-m09.pdf.
202 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 73, para. 4.
203 Id. para. 8(e).
204 For example, in March 2003, the top legal advisor to U.K. Prime Minister
Tony Blair wrote a subsequently leaked memo warning that "'the imposition of
major structural economic reforms' might violate international law, unless the Se-
curity Council specifically authorized it." Eviatar, supra note 190, at B9.
205 See Cummins, supra note 9 (noting in part that the "Bush administration
... would have to consider how the Iraqi public and the international community
would react to a postwar oil policy" in developing the oil industry); see also An-
drew Newton & Dr. Malaika Culverwell, Legitimacy Risks and Peace-Building Op-
portunities: Scoping the Issues for Businesses in Post-War Iraq (published under the
auspicies of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in the United Kingdom)
(examining the legitimacy challenges facing postwar Iraq), available at
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post-occupation Iraqi regime exercising its internationally recog-
nized sovereignty over its natural and other resources. 2 6 Further,
justifying a broad mandate on the premise that it is consistent with
the welfare of the Iraqi people is very reminiscent of the "sacred
trust of civilization" under which European countries justified
their mission of colonial rule and administration.
207
These expansive powers of radically transforming the Iraqi
economy and society are also questionable under Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations. As Nisuke Ando has argued, such major
transformations without the consent of the occupied people are in-
consistent with the temporary nature of occupation governance
and the principle of self-determination under international law.
20 8
Indeed, an occupier engaged in regulating and transforming social
and economic values and institutions, beyond restoring and ensur-
ing order as envisaged under Article 43, is invariably an interested
party and cannot claim to be in the position of a neutral trustee.
20 9
In the midst of the proposed and ongoing free market reforms,
President Bush has issued Executive Order 13303, entitled "Protect-
ing the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Other Property in
Which Iraq Has an Interest." 210 This Order prohibits all judicial
http://www.cfr.org/pdf/highlight/Legitimacy-risks-Iraq.pdf (last visited Mar.
10, 2004).
206 G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1194th plen. mtg. Supp. No. 17 at
15. U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). Article 1 provides that "[tihe right of peoples and
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be
exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the
people of the State concerned." Article 7, thereof, provides that the "[v]iolation of
the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and re-
sources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
and hinders the development of international cooperation and the maintenance of
peace." The Preamble of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, in addition, af-
firms "the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future
and control their own natural resources...." S.C. Res. 1483 pmbl., para. 4. Note
that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 adopted on October 16th, 2003 under-
scored "that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq," and reaffirmed
"the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and
control their natural resources." S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4844th
mtg. pmbl., para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (2003).
207 See Gathii, supra note 111, at 614-15 (discussing the role of racism and ar-
rogance played in the European colonization of African nations, and the contempt
locals felt towards colonizers).
208 ANDo, supra note 17, at 125.
209 BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 210.
210 Exec. Order No. 13,303, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,931 (May 22, 2003). The Supreme
Court has upheld this sort of Executive Order in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981), suggesting a wide scope for executive power during war.
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process, including, but not limited to, "attachment, judgment, de-
cree, lien, execution, and garnishment" with respect to the Iraq De-
velopment Fund and all interests in Iraqi oil products. This
broadly drafted order precludes suit to recover Iraqi assets with re-
spect to which any country or individual of any country may have
an interest. Simply put, it extinguishes rights of Americans and
others from pursuing judicial redress for any injuries that they may
suffer with respect to any interests touching on Iraqi oil or the Iraq
Development Fund. That covers almost all aspects of the CPA
mandate. In effect, the Executive Order immunizes the CPA and
its contractors from all legal process.
In particular, the Executive Order preempts the use of the Alien
Tort Act which confers federal district courts in the United States
"original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." 211 It therefore seems that the intention of the Presi-
dent in enacting the Executive Order was to immunize the CPA,
private contractors and other actors engaged in the occupation and
reconstruction of Iraq from lawsuits for a broad range of torts in-
cluding personal injury, death, damage to or loss of property
committed in Iraq for which liability would be imposed by U.S. or
international law.
6. THE EFFECT OF CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION ON IRAQI PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT AND
REMEDIAL OPTIONS
6.1. Comparing and Contrasting De-Fascitization, De-Baathification,
De-Nazification and the Liquidation of Japanese Zaibatsu
The de-fascistization program of the Allied forces in Italy in-
volved the impounding of the private property and assets of Fas-
cist organizations and their affiliates that had been disbanded.212
Individual members and sympathizers of these organizations had
property that they had illicitly acquired and confiscated, and they
were ejected from government jobs. However, "they were allowed
to maintain their pension rights."213 In addition, since a majority of
government jobs were held by members of the Fascist Party, the
211 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1879).





Allied powers did not eject all of them to allow the continuity of
Italian civil administration.214 After the occupation, Italian courts
invited to test the validity of occupation measures found them con-
sistent with the Hague Regulations.
215
In Germany, the Allied occupation was justified as necessary to
ensure the elimination of Nazism and militarism, engage in disar-
mament, recover reparations, control industry and all aspects of
the economy, reform education, and to ensure the democratic re-
construction of Germany through political decentralization. 216 The
United States' occupation of Japan was motivated by similar objec-
tives of demilitarization and democratization through measures
aimed at purging militarists and Ultranationalists as well as liqui-
dating of big business combines (Zaibatsu) and the private prop-
erty of individuals involved in these businesses.
217
The similarity of the foregoing occupation measures in Italy
and Japan, on the one hand, and Iraq on the other is that they all
sought to fundamentally change the very foundations and values
of the political, economic and social institutions in these countries
as they existed before occupation. However, in Japan, unlike in It-
aly and Germany, 218 the U.S. occupation measures, such as the
transfer to the Japanese government of the private property of in-
dividual members of the liquidated Zaibatsu combines, the restric-
tion of economic transactions on the part of some of these indi-
viduals, denials of pensions, and expropriation of their farmland
214 Id.
215 Id. at 69-71.
216 Id. at 59, 73.
217 Id. at 105 (arguing that the German instrument of surrender, the complete
collapse of the German government, as well as the period of occupation, conferred
on the occupiers more authority than the Hague Regulations).
218 Since in Japan many government officials depended almost entirely
on pensions to sustain their own lives and those of their dependents
after retirement, there can be no doubt that the flat prohibition of
pension payment caused great difficulties to the lives of the persons
involved .... It might be recalled that, in the implementation of de-
fascistization measures in occupied Italy, many members and collabo-
rators of the Fascist Party were removed from public service and part
of their wealth illicitly acquired under the Fascist regime was confis-
cated. But they were allowed to maintain their pension rights. Even
in the case of the denazification of Germany, members and collabora-
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were arguably inconsistent with the Hague Regulations. 21 9
The de-baathification of Iraq is one of the most important oc-
cupation objectives of the U.S.-led occupation.220 It has involved
the dissolution of not just the Baath Party but a whole continuum
of entities affiliated with Saddam Hussein, including defense, secu-
rity, information, and intelligence organs of government and the
entire structure of the Iraqi military including paramilitary units. 221
All the property and assets of the Baath Party are under order to be
seized and transferred to the CPA "for the benefit of the people of
Iraq."222 Individuals in possession or control of Baath Party prop-
erty are required to turn it in to the Coalition.223 An Iraqi Property
Claims Commission is authorized to return seized private prop-
erty. 224 The Iraqi De-Baathification Council is charged with the lo-
cation of Baathist officials and the assets of the Party and its offi-
219 Id. at 106 (arguing that since the Japanese occupation was followed by an
unconditional surrender and the Japanese government was still in place during
the occupation, there is room to argue that the Hague Regulations of 1907 did not
apply to the occupation).
220 The Preamble to the first order of the CPA on de-baathification notes in
part:
that the Iraqi people have suffered large scale human rights abuses and
depravations over many years at the hands of the Baath Party [and] the
grave concern of Iraqi society regarding the threat posed by the con-
tinuation of Baath Party networks and personnel in the administration of
Iraq, and the intimidation of the people of Iraq by Baath Party officials
Coalitional Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 1: Implementation of De-
Baathification Order No. 1 (CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01), available at http://
www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/CPAORDl.pdf.
221 Coalitional Provisional Authority Order No. 2: Dissolution of Entities
(CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations
/ CPAORD2.pdf.
222 Coalitional Provisional Authority Order No. 4: Management of Property
and Assets of the Iraqi Baath Party § 3(1) (CPA/PRD/25 May 2003/04), available at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/CPAORD4.pdf.
223 Id. § 3(3).
224 Coalitional Provisional Authority Regulation No. 8: Delegation of Author-
ity Regarding Establishment of a Property Claims Commission (CPA/REG/16
January 2004/08), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040114_
CPAREG_ 08_PCC.pdf. While the Property Rights Commission, a quasi-judicial
agency, has its regulations designed by the Governing Council, there is a Property
Reconciliation Facility, which is charged with administration of conflicting claims
to real property and is more of an executive agency under the direction of the
Administrator. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 4: Establishment




cials with a view to eliminating the party and its potential to in-
timidate the population.
225
The de-baathification of Iraqi institutions, like the judiciary,
proceeds apace with its Americanization. 226 As Tony Blair stated in
his address to Congress:
[O]urs are not Western values, they are the universal values
of the human spirit .... Anywhere, anytime ordinary peo-
ple are given the chance to choose, the choice is the same:
freedom not tyranny; democracy, not dictatorship; the rule
of law, not the rule of the secret police. The spread of free-
dom is the best security for the free .... And just as the ter-
rorist seeks to divide humanity in hate, so we have to unify
it around an idea. And that idea is liberty. We must find
strength to fight for this idea and the compassion to make it
universal. 2
27
For Blair, American and British values are universal, and so it fol-
lows that the de-baathification and reconstruction of Iraq is no less
neutral than those universal values. Yet, while repressive regimes
that violate people's rights must be held accountable, military ac-
tion that legitimizes wholesale reorganization of a militarily
weaker society also necessarily involves the imposition of the will
of the conquering state(s).228 Hence, unsurprisingly, otherwise
well-intended processes such as de-baathification have threatened
or resulted in the loss of employment and income for thousands of
225 Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 5: Establishment of the Iraqi
De-Baathification Council (CPA/ORD/17 June 2003/05), available at http://
www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/CPAORD5.pdf.
226 See Jim Edwards, Re-Building Iraq's Judicial System From the Ground Up,
N.J.L.J., Oct. 27, 2003 (reporting that a Judicial Assessment Team sent to Iraq by
the Justice Department recommended detailed judicial reforms in Iraq along the
lines of the U.S. legal system including: extension of Miranda style rights, attorney
compensation, case management, and so on), available at http://www.
law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1066605424932. For an alternative model of legal re-
form in Iraq that would involve exiled Iraqi jurists, the U.S. State Department and
a multinational group of experts, see Ori Nir, Long Path Ahead For Establishing Rule
of Law in Iraq, FORWARD, Apr. 18, 2003, available at http://www.forward.
com/issues/2003/03.04.18/news8.html.
227 149 CONG. REC. H7059 (2003) (address by Prime Minister Tony Blair to a
Joint Meeting of Congress).
228 Maxine Marcus, Humanitarian Intervention Without Borders: Belligerent Oc-
cupation or Colonization?, 25 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 102, 133-134 (2003).
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Iraqi professionals in the health and education sectors for simply
being ordinary members of the Baath Party.229 The related dissolu-
tion of the Iraqi army has added to the unemployment and disillu-
sionment of thousands of Iraqis. These and other outcomes of the
de-baathification process which have had a negative and cascading
effect on the families and dependents of those that have lost their
incomes are a reflection of the unilateral and undemocratic nature
of the unaccountable authority of the CPA, which has assumed all
legislative, judicial, and executive powers combined.230
Hence, like in Japan, but unlike in Italy and Germany, the
process of recreating the occupied country has resulted in ad-
versely affecting the private property rights of these non-Western
nationals to a far greater degree than similarly situated individuals
in the Western states of Italy and Germany. This outcome could be
coincidental or random, but in light of the unevenness and incon-
sistency of applying norms of international law as highlighted in
Section 1 and demonstrated in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this article,
this difference suggests that there is more to it.
6.2. Is a Sovereign Iraqi Government Bound by Measures Undertaken
By the U.S.-Led Occupation CPA?
The general rule is that a returning sovereign is obliged to rec-
ognize the validity of measures undertaken by an occupier if the
measures were within the occupier's authority. 231 However, under
the doctrine of postliminy, a returning sovereign may rescind those
acts of the occupant that do not meet the test of legality under in-
ternational law.232 Such legality has been tested under the Hague
229 Jonathan Steele, US Decree Strips Thousands of Their Jobs, GUARDIAN, Aug.
30, 2003, at 16.
230 See Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1: The Coalition Provi-
sional Authority § 1 (CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01) (outlining the scope of the
CPA's authority), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/REG1.pdf;
Brian Whitaker, Iraq's Fresh Start May Be Another False Dawn, GUARDIAN, Sept. 5,
2003; see also Amnesty International, Iraq: Memorandum on Concerns Related to
Legislation Introduced By the Coalition Provisional Authority, MDE 14/176/2003
(Dec. 4, 2003) (expressing concerns about the nature of powers reserved to the
Coalitional Provisional Authority in light of international human rights concerns),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE141762003.
231 See Felice Morgenstern, Validity of the Acts of the Belligerent Occupant, 28
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L. L. 291, 293 (1951) (describing an Austrian court ruling upholding
this principle).
232 FEILCHENFELD, supra note 173, at 145-50. A reason precluding application
of the doctrine of postliminy is where property is transferred with the permission




Regulations in cases where the acts of an occupying power were
questioned by a returning sovereign.233 However, without a forum
during the pendency of the occupation to inquire into and deter-
mine the validity of occupation measures, a future independent
and sovereign Iraqi government would have to play that role. Un-
fortunately, although the Security Council has authorized the Sec-
retary General to appoint a Special Representative to Iraq, the au-
thorization did not include a role for the Special Representative to
ensure that the occupying authorities complied with the Hague
Regulations or any other international legal obligations.
234
6.3. Mhat Other Forums for Remedying Occupation Violations Exist
for Iraqis?
Under Article 3 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, if a belligerent violates any of the
provisions of the Regulations, it will be liable to pay compensa-
tion.235 Thus where an occupying power has taken the oil wealth
of the occupied country to expand the occupying power's war
readiness, it has been held to be a violation of this prohibition and
of customs of war, particularly Article 53 of the Hague Regulations
of 1907.236
233 FEILCHENFELD, supra note 173, at 153.
234 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 73, para. 8; see BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 207,
which notes:
The decisive role played by the Security Council in ending the Iraqi oc-
cupation of Kuwait and subsequently establishing a peacekeeping force
to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq, are so far the strongest evidence of
the profound change in this organization. It is to be hoped that the mo-
mentum gathered in the past will pave the way for a more responsible
UN role with respect to other occupied territories.
235 The provision further states that a belligerent party would also be liable
for acts performed by its armed forces. In addition to Article 3 of the Hague
Regulations, compensation would also be available under general principles of
international law. Cf. Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9,
at 21 (stating that "an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form" is a
"principle of international law").
236 N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. War Damage Comm'n, 23
I.L.R. 810 (Singapore Ct. App. 1956). Similarly, the destruction of Kuwaiti oil
fields by Iraq in the 1991 invasion has been argued to constitute a violation of Ar-
ticle 23(g) of the Hague Regulations and Article 53 of Hague Convention IV.
Richard Carruthers, International Controls on the Impact on the Environment of War-
time Operations, 10 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 38, 48 (1993). But see Laura Edgerton, Eco-
Terrorist Acts During the Persian Gulf War: Is International Law Sufficient to Hold Iraq
Liable?, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 151, 172 (1992) (arguing that the provisions of
the Hague Convention failed to define what behavior is prohibited, thus leaving
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However, as observed above, a variety of difficulties confront a
future Iraqi government mediating claims of Iraqis whose property
was confiscated by the occupying power. These difficulties are.
compounded by Executive Order 13303 of 2003 immunizing the
U.S. government from any liability for the acts of the U.S. military,
the reluctance of the federal judiciary in the United States to give
relief to foreign litigants arising from a war executed by the U.S.
government, and the sheer complexity and expense of filing claims
for compensation.
On the basis of the reasoning in the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, December 2001 decision in the Bankovic case, the
European Convention on Human Rights is applicable in occupied
Iraq.237 To establish the application of the European Convention
on Human Rights in occupied Iraq and how it lays a basis for
remedies for confiscation and damage to property, I will briefly ex-
amine the facts leading up to the Bankovic decision. In this case, six
Yugoslavian nationals sought orders against the seventeen NATO
member states concerning the bombing of the Serbian Radio and
Television Headquarters in Belgrade during the NATO air strike
campaign in the Kosovo conflict.238 The applicants alleged that
their rights to life and to freedom of expression, as well as their
right to an effective remedy, guaranteed under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, were infringed. 239 The European Court
of Human Rights dismissed the application, holding that it lacked
jurisdiction because the European Convention was territorial in
scope and does not apply to the territory of non-contracting states,
such as Yugoslavia, unless it can be established that the affected
individuals or territory were within the "effective control" of con-
tracting states. 240
Iraq's actions outside its realm of control); Rex J. Zedalis, Burning of Kuwaiti Oil-
fields and the Laws of War, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711, 729-733 (1991) (noting
that Article 53 of Hague Convention IV is restricted to destruction of property
where the occupation was uncontested, and since the U.S.-led coalition of the Gulf
War struck at Iraq, the occupation was contested and therefore Article 53 was in-
applicable).
237 Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), reprinted in
123 I.L.R. 94 (2001).
238 Id. at 98-99; see also Michael Mandel, Politics and Human Rights in Interna-
tional Criminal Law: Our Case Against NATO and the Lessons to Be Learned From It, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95 (2001) (discussing the failed attempt to commence an inves-
tigation of illegal aerial bombardments by U.S.-led NATO allies in the Kosovo in-
tervention).
239 Bankovic, 123 I.L.R. at 102.




Clearly, during the period of occupation, Iraq is under the
effective control of the United States, the United Kingdom and
other members of the coalition. The United Kingdom is a contract-
ing state of the European Convention on Human Rights, and this
together with the United Kingdom's occupation of Iraq would
render its actions amenable to the jurisdiction of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Iraqis would therefore be able to
rely on the property protections of Article 1 of the First Protocol of
the European Convention on Human Rights 241 for redress for con-
fiscated and damaged property attributed to the United Kingdom
and other members of the coalition that are parties to the Conven-
tion. Since Article 1 subjects deprivations of property to the gen-
eral principles of international law, it follows that the Hague Regu-
lations242 fall within the scope of the norms applicable within
jurisdiction of the European Court and Commission of Human
Rights. There is already precedent for admissibility of petitions
seeking relief for violation of international humanitarian law in the
context of military occupation by non-state parties against state
parties of the European Convention. In one such case, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights observed:
[T]he responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise
when as a consequence of military action-whether lawful
or unlawful -it exercises effective control of an area outside
its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an
area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention de-
rives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised
241 Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights
provides:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions
shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other con-
tributions or penalties.
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, March 20, 1952, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 224, available at http://www.echr
.coe.int/ convention/ webconvenENG.pdf.
242 As already alluded to before, the Hague Regulations are a statement of
general principles of international law.
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directly, through its armed forces, or through subordinate
local administration.
243
Similarly, analogous arguments could be made with reference
to the United States within the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. In
fact, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has, in a
case involving U.S. military action in Panama, rejected the U.S.
government's contention that the Fourth Geneva Convention and
the general international laws governing use of force and armed
conflict, which include the Hague Regulations, do not fall within
its jurisdiction.2
44
In the context of adjudication, another avenue to seek relief
would be courts in occupied Iraq. But such courts are incapaci-
tated by the possibility of retaliation for declaring occupation
measures a nullity.245 As was previously discussed, federal courts
in the United States would most likely defer to the Executive
Branch, especially with regard to the conduct of war overseas. 246 In
addition, relief by a foreign claimant would have to overcome a
maze of procedural barriers, including jurisdiction and standing,
before it could be entertained on the merits. Judicial review in a
third country not part of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq is a possi-
bility for Iraqis seeking to test the validity of occupation measures.
However, the United States has expressed great exception not only
to international tribunals, like the International Criminal Court,
testing the legality of U.S. personnel involvement in military action
around the world, but of third country courts such as with regard
243 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
para. 62 (1995).
244 Here, the Inter-American Commission argued that
Where it is asserted that a use of military force has resulted in noncom-
batant deaths, personal injury, and property loss, the human rights of
noncombatants are implicated. In the context of the present case, the
guarantees set forth in the American Declaration are implicated. This
case sets forth allegations cognizable within the framework of the Decla-
ration. Thus, the Commission is authorized to consider the subject matter
of this case.
Case 10.573, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 312, OEA/ser. L./V.85, doc. 9 rev. (1993), reprinted
in 123 I.L.R. 117, 134-35.
245 BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 197.




to Belgium in the recent past.247
Where there has been deliberate or accidental destruction by
military means of property conceded to be private, the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to assess the claim of military
necessity or whether the property was private if there is a claim of
enemy property designation.248 Jurisdiction is available in such
cases because judicial deference to the Executive is not total. How-
ever, where the military engaged in deliberate damage to private
property that the Executive Branch or the military had designated
as enemy property, a federal court has no jurisdiction to examine
the validity of the designation even if there is evidence suggesting
that the designation was inaccurate as it seemed to be with the
bombing of the pharmaceutical factory in Sudan in 1998.249 In ad-
dition, the seizure, occupation or destruction of private property in
furtherance of a military objective would predispose a federal
court towards denial of a claim for compensation. Foreigners pro-
ceeding on the theory that just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment would entitle them for takings relief in the United
States, even in cases of destruction of private property for non-
military purposes, face the almost insurmountable hurdle of the
availability of the amendment's protection to foreigners and
whether it applies to military operations.
As noted earlier in Section 4, another alternative open to Iraqis
is the settlement of claims to private property by the U.S. Judge
Advocate General ("JAG") Corps under the Foreign Claims Act,
though this process does not require judicial adjudication.250 Fi-
nally, with regard to judicial fora, it remains open for a future Iraqi
government to approach the U.N. General Assembly to seek an
247 It has been noted:
[The Belgian] government, its consciousness raised by the increased
global attention to individual responsibility for human rights atrocities,
enacts a broad statute opening its courts to prosecutions of suspected
murderers, torturers, and war criminals around the world. . . . The
United States government eventually signals opposition to the statute,
leading to its nearly instantaneous modification; when the United States
says it is still too broad, the government gets the idea entirely.
Steven S. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888,
888-889.
248 E1-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 772-773 (2003).
249 Id. at 771.
250 See Blum, supra note 154, at 1 ("Under the Foreign Claims Act, the U.S.
military may compensate foreign nationals and businesses for losses unrelated to
combat by applying local law and custom.").
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advisory opinion regarding the legality of occupation measures
under Article 96 of the U.N. Charter, as the Palestinians have suc-
cessfully done with regard to the building of a wall by Israel to
separate the occupied territories from Israel.
A nonjudicial, or quasi-judicial, claims settlement forum
might be an alternative. However, in such a forum, those whose
private property and contract rights were confiscated in the war
would more likely than not receive only a small proportion, if any-
thing, of what they lost. Such is the predicament of the people of a
poor nation whose invasion, conquest and occupation adversely
affected their property and contract rights. In the meantime, the
rights of foreign investors in Iraq receive far more attention than
the rights of the private property holders in Iraq affected by the
conquest and occupation. In addition, the ongoing plans and
process of massive transfers of publicly owned assets to foreign
owned corporations raise additional questions of international le-
gality and legitimacy among the Iraqis.
At the end of the occupation, an opportunity presents itself for
a peace treaty between the U.S.-led allies and the new Iraqi gov-
ernment. Under such agreement, one of the elements could very
well provide for a process of compensating for seized state assets
and private property. 251 There may very well be a role for a U.N.-
supervised process here in light of its experience in nation-building
and reconstruction after war. In fact, there have been suggestions
that the U.N. Compensation Commission, established by the Secu-
rity Council in May 1991 which entertained claims from the 1991
Gulf War, could very well continue its mission with the latest war
against Iraq.25 2
There is also the age-old tool of diplomatic pressure supported
by active lobbying by interested groups, such as in the model used
to recover confiscated property in Nazi Germany. There are also
lessons to be taken from the variety of growing reparations move-
251 This proposition with reference to public assets like cash, funds and real-
izable securities is also suggested by Ernest H. Feilchenfeld. FEILCHENFELD, supra
note 173, at 54; see also Sommerich, supra note 14, at 153 (noting that treaties of
peace "commonly provide for the restoration of private property and debts.").
252 See Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, New War May Mean More Claims for UNCC:
Texas Attorneys Helped Evaluate Payouts From First Gulf Conflict, 19(3) TEX. LAW.,
Mar. 25, 2003 ("The new war in the Persian Gulf could mean more work for the
United Nations Compensation Commission and more opportunity for Texas law-





ments, which have had varying levels of appeal and success in the
court of public opinion as well as in courtrooms.
7. CONCLUSIONS: BEYOND ORIENTALISM AND CONQUEST:
PROPERTY, CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Throughout this article, I have shown that rules of international
law governing what happens upon conquest favor the interests of
powerful Western states at the expense of conquered states, espe-
cially where the conquered states are non-Western. I have also
shown that the rules of occupation with regard to private property
rights protect peoples of non-Western states less than they protect
the property of Western owners similarly situated and affected by
conquest and occupation. This vulnerability is enhanced with re-
gard to states like Iraq and Afghanistan, in part because the image
of a terrorist as a sunglass-wearing bearded Muslim in a turban,
which existed long before September 11, 2001,253 has become en-
sconced in occidental culture, particularly in the United States, and
though based on a simplistic stereotype has been effectively mobi-
lized to lend credence to loosening both the civil liberties protec-
tions and the private property rights for Arabs and Persians of the
Muslim faith. Edward Said captured the difficulty of the dilemma
in the following terms:
One aspect of the electronic post-modern world is that there
has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the
Orient is viewed. Television, the films, and all the media's
resources have forced information into more and more
standardized molds [not to mention September 11, 2001]
.... This is nowhere more true than in the ways by which
the Near East is grasped. Three things have contributed to
making even the simplest perception of the Arabs and Is-
lam into highly politicized, almost raucous matter: one is
the history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice
in the West, which is immediately reflected in the history of
Orientalism; two, the struggle between the Arabs and Is-
raeli Zionism, and its effects upon American Jews as well as
253 See Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw, in
AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 294, 306-307 (Dan Danielsen &
Karen Engle eds., 1995) (discussing the view of terrorists as illegitimate combat-
ants).
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upon both the liberal culture and the population at large;
three, the almost total absence of any cultural position mak-
ing it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to
discuss the Arabs or Islam. Furthermore, it hardly needs
saying that because the Middle East is now so identified
with Great Power politics, oil economics, and the simple-
minded dichotomy of freedom-loving democratic Israel
and evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs, the chances of
anything like a clear view of what one talks about in talking
about the Near East are depressingly small.
254
Indeed, as I have demonstrated in this paper, the peculiar na-
ture of the international law applied towards non-European peo-
ples is a reflection of a unique form of Western, American, or Euro-
pean power rather than a direct translation of these forms.255 As
Harold Hongju Koh 256, Anne Marie Slaughter, 257 and Mariano-
Florentino Cuellar,258 among others, have demonstrated, the Iraqi
invasion and the transgressions of international law that have oc-
curred are the result of a small but growing group of "well-
positioned individuals, who, by serving as key institutional choke-
points, have successfully promoted particular well-publicized acts
of American exceptionalism." 259
Needless to say, the importance of the rule of law in interna-
tional relations, especially with regard to relations between power-
ful hegemonic states on the one hand and weaker vulnerable states
on the other, cannot be overstated. Indeed, the official discourse of
American exceptionalism and unilateralism is not new in the con-
text of relations between conquering and conquered states, as we
have seen throughout this paper, and neither is the sanctification of
254 SAID, supra note 177, at 26-27.
255 For more on this point, see Ann Laura Stoler, Rethinking Colonial Catego-
ries: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule, 31 COMP. STUD. Soc'Y & HIST.
134, 136-37 (1989).
256 Harold H. Koh, American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 (2003).
257 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Rallying Cry, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEWSL.,
Nov./Dec. 2003, at 6 (regretting the growing convergence between the right and
left in the U.S. in supporting the weakening, if not the disappearance, of the com-
mitment to a rule-based international order and calling supporters of international
law to fight back).
258 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The International Criminal Court and the Politi-
cal Economy of Antitreaty Discourse, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2003).




the economic interests of American and Western investors in the
so-called developing countries.260 These discourses must be ex-
posed, as I hope I have done here, and resisted, challenged and
protested.261 Otherwise, there shall be successive waves of their
evocation and re-enactment awaiting moments like the unfortunate
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States for rein-
forcement and reiteration. By resisting, challenging and protesting
hegemonic goals of powerful countries, institutions and corpora-
tions we also serve to delegitimize the American and European
self-images of privilege and rule over non-European peoples.262
The findings of this article regarding the difference in the ap-
plication of both the rule against extinction of private property and
contract rights and the status of private property rights under oc-
cupation as between Europeans and non-Europeans may be mis-
takenly traced to a theory of cultural politics that suggests that
non-Europeans do not recognize private property rights and that
only Europeans or Westerners recognize them because they are an
inherent feature of European and Western society. This view is
mistaken to the extent to which it does not recognize that the dis-
regard of non-Western private property rights is born out of the
crucible of the encounter between a self-righteous Western cultural
project and non-Western civilizations often designated as back-
ward, barbaric, poor, smelly, and lazy but which nevertheless,
have and continue to have their own political and ethical virtue.263
260 See, e.g., MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER, (1979) (discussing the role of international law in shaping the international
economic order); M. SONARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE
PROBLEM OF STATE CONTRAcTs (1990).
261 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: Challenges
of Theorizing Resistance, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397, 400 (2003) ("[I]nternational
law requires a theory of resistance to remain relevant .... ).
262 Gerry Simpson, The Great Powers, Sovereign Equality and the Making of the
United Nations Charter, 21 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 133 (2002) (showing that interna-
tional order is organized around two contrasting versions of liberalism, one based
on the sovereign equality and another based on the view that it is the special re-
sponsibility of the great powers to "police" the world and maintain order, espe-
cially to ensure that "rogue" states "toe the line").
263 For an excellent analysis, see Antony Anghie, Francisco De Vitoria and The
Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 321 (1996); Antony
Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century In-
ternational Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1999); Antony Anghie, "The Heart of My Home":
Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 445 (1993);
Antony Anghie, Creating the Nation State: Colonialism and Making of International Law
(1995) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Harvard University) (on file with the Harvard
University Library); and Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political
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Further, the massive privatization of publicly owned Iraqi as-
sets by the U.S.-led occupation force raises questions about its le-
gality under the Hague Regulations and the international norms
recognizing the Iraqis' sovereignty over their resources. Placing
the massive resources of the Iraqis in the hands of foreign firms
without giving Iraqis an opportunity to participate in their owner-
ship and management raises questions about the legitimacy of the
process and the future sustainability of decisions taken by the oc-
cupying forces.
Part of the challenge confronting the Iraqi people at the mo-
ment is a larger question of seeking the best arrangements at the
national level that would simultaneously recognize the human
rights of all individuals, irrespective of their background, while at
the same time respecting their diverse cultures and religions par-
ticularly those of minorities and women. At the international level,
the challenge is not different. It requires an acknowledgment of
the human rights of all non-Western people vulnerable to con-
quest, and further recognizing that projects of imperial conquest
that are facilitated by orientalist images of Arabs and Persians as
terrorists do not serve the goals of global security but actually
work against global security. By upholding these rights, the peo-
ples of the vulnerable states of the world would not have to live in
the fear that powerful countries will run over them and appropri-
ate or confiscate their private property while privatizing their pub-
lic assets. In Iraq, this is happening at a time when Iraqis can least
afford to lose their public and private assets to the powerful and
organized business interests swarming over their country as if it
were fallen prey.
Perspective on Culture and Terrorism, 104 AM. ANTHROLOGIST 766 (2002).
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